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ABSTRACT
The rise of offshoring of intermediate inputs raises important questions for commercial policy. Do
the distinguishing features of offshoring introduce novel reasons for trade policy intervention? Does
offshoring create new problems of global policy cooperation whose solutions require international
agreements with novel features? Can trade agreements that are designed to address problems that arise
when trade predominantly takes the form of the exchange of final goods be expected to perform in
a world where offshoring is prevalent? In this paper we provide answers to these questions, and thereby
initiate the study of trade agreements in the presence of offshoring. We do so by deriving the Nash
and internationally efficient trade policy choices of governments in an environment in which some
trade flows involve the exchange of customized inputs, contracts governing these transactions are
incomplete, and the matching between final-good producers and input suppliers may involve search
frictions. By characterizing the differences between Nash and internationally efficient policies in this
environment, and by comparing these differences to those that would arise in the absence of offshoring
of customized inputs, we seek to understand the implications of offshoring for the role of trade agreements.
Our findings indicate that the rise of offshoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements,
because in the presence of offshoring, (i) the mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of intervention
on to their trading partners is more complicated and extends to a wider set of policies than is the case
when offshoring is not present, and (ii) because the underlying problem that a trade agreement must
address in the presence of offshoring varies with the political preferences of member governments.
As a consequence, the increasing prevalence of offshoring is likely to make it increasingly difficult
for governments to rely on simple and general rules -- such as reciprocity and non-discrimination --
to help them solve their trade-related problems.
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International trade in intermediate inputs is a prominent feature of the world economy. Using
OECD input-output tables, Ramanarayanan (2006) concludes that in the late 1990s imports of
intermediate goods comprised between forty and sixty percent of total merchandise imports for
a large number of OECD countries. Similarly, a thorough examination of highly disaggregated
trade data led Yeats (2001) to conclude that intermediate input trade accounted for roughly thirty
percent of world trade in manufacturing goods in 1995. Furthermore, several authors have noted
that the share of intermediate inputs in world trade appears to have increased signi￿cantly in recent
years.1
Recent developments in international trade theory have attempted to bridge the apparent gap
between the characteristics of international trade in the data and the standard representation of
these trade ￿ ows in terms of ￿nal goods in neoclassical trade theory. One branch of this new liter-
ature has focused on incorporating input trade in otherwise standard models with perfectly com-
petitive markets and frictionless contracting.2 Another branch of the literature has stressed that
modelling ￿o⁄shoring￿as simply an increase in the fragmentation of production across countries
misses important aspects of the characteristics of intermediate input trade.3 First, intermediate
inputs tend to be much more customized to their intended buyers than ￿nal goods, and hence,
input trade embodies a disproportionate amount of relationship-speci￿c investments. Second, be-
cause contracts involving international transactions are especially hard to enforce, the cross-border
exchange of specialized intermediate inputs cannot generally be governed by the same contractual
safeguards that usually accompany similar exchanges occurring within borders. A third distin-
guishing feature of o⁄shoring is that it is often associated with the costly search for suitable foreign
suppliers that can provide the required inputs. The recent empirical studies of Feenstra and Hanson
(2005), Yeaple (2006), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007), and Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008) substantiate
the empirical relevance of these non-standard features of o⁄shoring.
The rise of o⁄shoring raises important questions for commercial policy. Do the distinguishing
features of o⁄shoring introduce novel reasons for trade policy intervention? Does o⁄shoring create
new problems of global policy cooperation whose solutions require international agreements with
novel features? Can trade agreements that are designed to address problems that arise when trade
predominantly takes the form of the exchange of ￿nal goods be expected to perform in a world
where o⁄shoring is prevalent?
In this paper we provide answers to these questions, and thereby initiate the study of trade
agreements in the presence of o⁄shoring. We do so by deriving the Nash and internationally ef-
1See, for instance, Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), Feenstra (1998), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels, Ishii
and Yi (2001) and Borga and Zeile (2004).
2See for instance the work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), Jones (2000), Deardor⁄ (2001), Antr￿s, Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), or Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Antr￿s and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) review this
literature.
3Theoretical developments include the work of McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2005), Antr￿s
(2003, 2005), and Antr￿s and Helpman (2004). See Helpman (2006) and Antr￿s and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for
surveys of this literature.
1￿cient trade policy choices of governments in an environment in which some trade ￿ ows involve
the exchange of customized inputs, contracts governing these transactions are incomplete, and the
matching between ￿nal-good producers and input suppliers may involve search frictions. By charac-
terizing the di⁄erences between Nash and internationally e¢ cient policies in this environment, and
by comparing these di⁄erences to those that would arise in the absence of o⁄shoring of customized
inputs, we seek to understand the implications of o⁄shoring for the role of trade agreements.
We adopt the simplest setting that can capture the main features of o⁄shoring that we wish
to study, and then later show that our main points are robust to a variety of generalizations.
We consider two ￿small￿countries, Home and Foreign, who face a ￿xed world price for a single
homogeneous ￿nal good. Production of the ￿nal good requires a customized input; all ￿nal-good
producers are located in Home; and all input suppliers are located in Foreign. Contracts between
suppliers and producers are incomplete, and so the terms of exchange between input suppliers and
￿nal-good producers are determined by bargaining ex post (after investment in input supply has
already been determined). Finally, we abstract initially from political economy concerns, and take
real aggregate income as our measure of national and world welfare. In this setting, an international
hold-up problem naturally arises under free trade, leading to an ine¢ ciently low volume of input
trade.
From this starting point, we turn to an investigation of the role of trade policies. We assume
that each country can apply taxes/subsidies to trade in the input and/or the ￿nal good. We ￿rst
reconsider the case for free trade in this environment. As might be expected, the distortions associ-
ated with international hold up create an activist role for policy intervention from the perspective
of world welfare. Intuitively, the combination of relationship-speci￿c investments and incomplete
contracts results in an international hold-up problem that leads to an ine¢ ciently low volume of
input trade across countries under free trade, as we have pointed out above. It is therefore natural
that trade policies which encourage input trade volume can serve as a substitute for more stan-
dard contractual safeguards available in domestic transactions and can thereby help bring countries
closer to the e¢ ciency frontier. Importantly, though, the mechanism by which trade policies a⁄ect
input trade volumes in this environment is by altering the conditions of ex-post bargaining be-
tween foreign suppliers and domestic producers, and is therefore distinct from the standard manner
that ￿nal-goods trade volumes respond to trade policy intervention (through changes in domestic
demand and/or competing domestic supply and their implications for market-clearing conditions).
Nevertheless, we show that an appropriate choice of input trade subsidies, combined with free trade
in ￿nal goods, can fully resolve the international hold-up problem and allow countries to attain the
￿rst-best.
We next ask whether the Nash equilibrium policy choices of governments coincide with the
internationally e¢ cient policies. We ￿nd that they do not, and we identify two dimensions of
international ine¢ ciency that arise under Nash policies: an ine¢ ciently low input trade volume;
and an ine¢ ciently low price of the ￿nal good in the Home market. Intuitively, trade policy serves
a dual role in this environment. On the one hand, as indicated above, subsidies to the exchange
2of intermediate inputs can serve as a substitute for more standard contractual safeguards available
in domestic transactions and can thus increase the volume of input trade toward its e¢ cient level.
On the other hand, input trade taxes can be used to redistribute surplus across countries, thereby
shifting some of the cost of intervention on to trading partners. For instance, although an export tax
may reduce the incentive of Foreign suppliers to invest, in their ex-post bargaining these suppliers
will be able to pass part of the cost of the tax on to ￿nal-good producers in Home. Moreover,
we show that the Home government will also distort trade in the ￿nal good away from its free-
trade level in order to reduce the domestic ￿nal-good price and further shift bargaining surplus
from Foreign input suppliers to Home ￿nal-good producers in this fashion. There is hence a basic
tension that each government faces in its unilateral trade policy choices between correcting the hold-
up problem and capturing surplus from/shifting costs onto its trading partner, and this tension
prevents governments from making internationally e¢ cient policy choices in the Nash equilibrium.
In the absence of o⁄shoring of customized inputs, we show that only the ￿rst of the ine¢ ciencies
identi￿ed above (that associated with input trade policies) is present in the Nash equilibrium,
and that the second ine¢ ciency (that associated with Home￿ s ￿nal-good tari⁄) does not arise.
Together with the ￿ndings above this leads to our ￿rst broad conclusion: the rise in o⁄shoring
is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements, because in the presence of o⁄shoring the
mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of intervention on to their trading partners is
more complicated, and extends to a wider set of policies than is the case when o⁄shoring is not
present.4 More broadly we argue that when international trade involves the o⁄shoring of specialized
components, an e⁄ective trade agreement must extend its focus beyond the traditional ￿market
access￿ concerns of establishing and maintaining conditions of competition to cover as well the
conditions of bargaining.5
We next turn to a particularly relevant extension of our model, and introduce the possibility
that governments are motivated in part by political economy/redistributive concerns. We show
that the introduction of political economy motives into our model can eliminate unrealistic policy
predictions (e.g., convert import subsidies to import taxes and export taxes to export subsidies),
but we con￿rm that the implications of o⁄shoring for the nature of e⁄ective trade agreements as
described above is preserved. More speci￿cally, we establish that su¢ ciently politically motivated
governments will adopt import tari⁄s and export subsidies in the Nash equilibrium, but we show
that it is still the case that an e¢ cient trade agreement must secure the adoption of input-trade
policies that expand the volume of input trade and secure the adoption of ￿nal-good trade policies
4More speci￿cally, we compare the role of a trade agreement in our model of o⁄shoring to that which would arise
if there were trade in intermediate inputs but these inputs were not customized. In the latter situation we say that
o⁄shoring ￿is not present￿in order to draw a distinction between that situation and the characteristics of o⁄shoring
that we emphasize in this paper.
5This feature also distinguishes our framework from the work of Brander and Spencer (1985), who emphasize the
potential pro￿t-shifting e⁄ects of export subsidies in the presence of imperfect competition. Although our model
also features a pro￿t-shifting motive for trade policy, the novel conclusions we reach regarding the task of a trade
agreement could not be derived in their framework, due to the market-clearing nature of prices in their model. Bagwell
and Staiger (2002, Ch. 9) formalize this point by showing that the assumption of Cournot oligopoly alone does not
change the basic terms-of-trade/market-access problem for a trade agreement to solve.
3in Home that raise the ￿nal-good price in Home￿ s market.
We also use our political-economy extension to consider the link between the role of trade
agreements in the presence of o⁄shoring and the role of trade agreements according to the (politically
augmented) terms-of-trade theory. Here we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1999) with one important
distinction: in our model of o⁄shoring, we show that the terms-of-trade impacts of trade policies can
be sorted into ￿good￿and ￿bad￿components. With this distinction, we borrow terminology from
Bagwell and Staiger and de￿ne politically optimal policies as those policies that would hypothetically
be chosen by governments unilaterally if they took account of the good terms-of-trade impacts of
their intervention while placing zero value on the bad. We then ask whether politically optimal
tari⁄s are e¢ cient, and thereby explore whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies described above can be
given a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation, according to which the fundamental problem faced
by governments in designing their trade agreement is to ￿nd ways to eliminate the ￿bad￿terms-of-
trade manipulation while maintaining/encouraging the ￿good.￿
We show that the Nash ine¢ ciency associated with input trade policies can indeed be given
a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation along the lines described above. But we show that the
Nash ine¢ ciency associated with the Home ￿nal-good trade policy can only be given such an
interpretation if governments lack political economy motives: when political economy motives are
present, there exists a distinct problem for a trade agreement to solve with respect to ￿nal-good
trade policy that cannot be given even a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation.
Again, in the absence of o⁄shoring of customized inputs we show that a (standard) terms-of-
trade interpretation applies, and together with the ￿ndings above this leads to our second broad
conclusion: if political economy motives are taken to be widespread and varied, then the rise in
o⁄shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements, because the underlying problem
that a trade agreement must address varies with the political preferences of member governments.
As a consequence, under the view that governments operate in the presence of important political
economy forces, the increasing prevalence of o⁄shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for
governments to rely on simple and general rules ￿such as reciprocity and non-discrimination ￿to
help them solve their trade-related problems.
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, as emphasized above, by exploring the role of
trade agreements in a model with intermediate input trade and in an environment with relationship-
speci￿c investments and incomplete contracting, we complement and extend an established liter-
ature on international trade agreements (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, Ch. 2, for a review of
this literature). In suggesting a novel rationale for trade agreements, our paper also complements
the recent paper by Ossa (2008). Second, by considering endogenous trade policy choices in this
environment, we complement and extend a recent literature that has begun to study the impacts
of (exogenous) tari⁄s on international hold-up problems. Ornelas and Turner (2008a) develop a
model in which import tari⁄s on intermediate inputs are shown to aggravate the hold-up problem
in international vertical relationships, with the implication that trade liberalization may lead to a
larger increase in trade ￿ ows than in standard models. Ornelas and Turner do not however study
4optimal trade policies or the possibility of trade agreements in their framework.6;7 McLaren (1997)
studies the desirability of announcing a future trade liberalization in a model where producers incur
sunk costs to service foreign markets, but his framework emphasizes commitment problems from
which we completely abstract.8
Finally, there is a large literature proposing a variety of mechanism-design resolutions to the
hold-up ine¢ ciencies caused by incomplete contracts. These resolutions however generally rely on
the ability of parties to commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and also on the existence of a
third party that can enforce o⁄-the-equilibrium-path penalties.9 We view our international context
as one in which these alternative resolutions of the hold-up problem are naturally more problematic,
and thus trade taxes and subsidies may be particularly useful in resolving these ine¢ ciencies. For
this same reason, we ￿nd it natural to simplify our model in a way that avoids completely any
source of domestic hold-up ine¢ ciencies.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a Benchmark Model that
introduces the international hold-up problem and illustrates the valuable role of active second-best
trade policies. In section 3, we consider Nash equilibrium policy choices and show that they leave
room for a welfare-enhancing international trade agreement. In section 4, we develop an extension
with politically motivated governments and relate our theory of trade agreements to the terms-
of-trade theory. In section 5, we consider a variety of extensions of the model. We o⁄er some
concluding remarks in section 6.
2 The Benchmark Model
We begin this section by describing a benchmark two-small-country trade model in which ￿nal-good
producers in the home country import inputs from suppliers in the foreign country. We refer to
this model as the Benchmark Model. While simple and special along a number of dimensions, the
Benchmark Model is meant to highlight the essential features of the basic international hold-up
problem which arises under free trade. After presenting the setup and characterizing the free-trade
equilibrium, we derive the (second-best) trade policies that maximize world welfare.
6The recent and independent paper of Ornelas and Turner (2008b) does begin to explore the welfare implications
of tari⁄s in this kind of environment, but their focus is very di⁄erent from ours and they do not consider the possible
role of trade agreements.
7Similarly, Antr￿s and Helpman (2004) and Diez (2008) study the e⁄ect of trade frictions on the choice of orga-
nizational form of ￿rms contemplating o⁄shoring, but they also treat trade frictions as exogenous.
8Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992) also emphasize commitment problems associated with trade relationships that
involve substantial relationship- (or market-) speci￿c investments, but they focus on how these issues a⁄ect the choice
between unilateral liberalization, bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements.
9Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 12) o⁄er an excellent overview of the insights and limitations of this
literature.
10In related work, Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) show that, in a closed economy setup, a government can use
taxation to alleviate the hold-up problem between domestic buyers and sellers.
52.1 Setup
We consider a world of two small countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), and a large rest-of-world
whose only role in the model is to ￿x the price at which a ￿nal good 1 is available to H and F
on world markets (the direction of trade in good 1 is not speci￿ed and is immaterial). Consumer
preferences are identical in H and F and given by
Uj = c
j
0 + u
￿
c
j
1
￿
, (1)
where c
j
i is consumption of good i 2 f0;1g in country j 2 fH;Fg, and where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
Good 0, which we take to be the numeraire, is assumed to be costlessly traded and available in
su¢ cient quantities that it is always consumed in positive amounts in both H and F. Good 1 is
produced with a customized intermediate input x according to the production function y (x), with
y0 (x) > 0 and y00 (x) < 0.11 By choice of units for measuring the quantity of good 1, we set its
(￿xed) price on world markets equal to 1. For now we assume that trade in good 1 is free, so that
its price is equal to 1 everywhere in the world.
We suppose that the home country H is inhabited by a unit measure of producers of the ￿nal
good 1, while the foreign country F is inhabited by a unit measure of suppliers of the intermediate
input x. Hence, to produce the ￿nal good 1, producers in H must import inputs from suppliers in
F. Suppliers in F tailor their inputs speci￿cally to the needs of a ￿nal-good producer in H and, for
simplicity, these inputs are assumed to be useless to alternative ￿nal-good producers. We assume
that the marginal cost of input production in F is constant and, through choice of the units in
which inputs are measured, we normalize it to 1. For now, we also assume that trade in x is free.
We next turn to focus on the nature of the bilateral relationship between a ￿nal-good producer
in H and an input supplier in F, which comprises the essence of the model. We adopt a setting of
incomplete contracts between ￿nal-good producers and input suppliers. In our Benchmark Model,
contractual incompleteness can be rationalized in the following simple way. Following Grossman
and Helpman (2002) and Antr￿s (2003), we assume that, when investing in the supply of x, the
supplier can choose between manufacturing a high-quality or a low-quality input, and the latter can
be produced at lower cost but is useless to ￿nal-good producers. The quantity of x is observable
to everyone and therefore veri￿able by third-parties, but we assume that the quality of x is only
observable to the supplier and producer in the particular bilateral relationship, and so quality-
contingent contracts are not available. Although parties could still sign a contract specifying a
price and a quantity, if they did so, the supplier would always have an incentive to produce the low
quality input (at lower cost) and still receive the same contractually stipulated price.
Hence, in this environment, no (enforceable) contracts are signed between suppliers and pro-
ducers prior to the initial supplier investment decisions. And without an initial contract, the price
at which each supplier in F sells its inputs to a producer in H is then decided ex-post (through
bargaining) once quality has been chosen. We follow the bulk of the literature in assuming that the
11In order to ensure that the second-order conditions are met, we will later impose additional assumptions on y (x).
6bargained price is determined through symmetric Nash bargaining. Because parties have symmet-
ric information at the bargaining stage, ex-post e¢ ciency ensures that low-quality production will
never be chosen by an input supplier in equilibrium, and so only high-quality inputs are produced:
as a result, the input-quality dimension of the model can be kept in the background henceforth.
We now describe the structure of the bilateral producer-supplier relationship in detail. We
assume that all agents have an ex-ante zero outside option. The sequence of events is as follows:
stage 1. The unit measure of producers in H and suppliers in F are randomly matched, producing
a unit measure of matches. Each agent decides whether to stay with his match or exit the
market. In the former case, the producer provides the supplier with a list of customized input
speci￿cations. In the latter case, each agent obtains his ex-ante outside option (equal to zero).
stage 2. Each supplier decides on the amount x of customized input to be produced (at marginal
cost of 1).
stage 3. Each producer-supplier pair bargains over the price of the intermediate input (we assume
symmetric Nash bargaining).
stage 4. Each producer in H imports x from its partner-supplier and produces the ￿nal good with
the acquired x, and payments agreed in stage 3 are settled.
This 4-stage game generates the simple hold-up problem that forms the heart of our analysis.
A number of features of this setup are worth noting at this point.
First, we rule out the use of ex-ante (stage-1) lump-sum transfers between producers and
suppliers. The possibility of these transfers is particularly hard to defend in the international
context that we study, where such transfers and the obligations associated with them might be
di¢ cult to enforce. In section 5, however, we will show that our main results are robust to allowing
for these transfers. Second, we assume a frictionless matching process in stage 1 to keep our
Benchmark Model simple: in section 5 we introduce search frictions. Third, the role of the speci￿city
of input x is to pin down the outside options of the producer and the supplier should their stage-
3 bargaining break down. In our Benchmark Model we take an extreme view of the degree of
speci￿city, so that the breakup of a bargaining pair in stage 3 would result in a zero outside option
for both producer and supplier. We relax this assumption in section 5, where we introduce a
secondary market for inputs. Fourth, we assume symmetric Nash bargaining in stage 3. This helps
to keep the number of parameters to a minimum in our Benchmark Model and allows us to focus
on the main points. However, we also relax this assumption in section 5, where we consider general
bargaining power.
Finally, we note that production e¢ ciency requires that the customized input is produced at a
level xE which satis￿es
y0 ￿
xE￿
= 1; (2)
7and thereby equates the marginal revenue generated from an additional unit of the input (recall
that the price of the ￿nal good is ￿xed by world markets and equal to 1 under free trade) with the
marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the input (which is constant and normalized to 1).
2.2 Free Trade Equilibrium
We now characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 4-stage game described above. The
characterization follows very simply from a few key observations. We consider a representative
producer in H and supplier in F that are matched in stage 1.
First, if the producer uses the supplier￿ s input to produce the ￿nal good in stage 4, its revenue
is given by y (x). Second, as observed in the previous section, the outside options of both the
producer and the supplier in their stage-3 Nash bargain are 0, and hence the quasi-rents over
which the producer and supplier bargain in stage 3 (recall that the cost of producing x is sunk at
this point) are y (x). Therefore, in the symmetric Nash bargain of stage 3, the ￿nal-good producer
in H and the input supplier in F both obtain a payo⁄ of 1
2y (x).
Next, rolling back to stage 2, observe that the input supplier chooses x to maximize 1
2y (x)￿x,
so the optimal quantity ^ x of input satis￿es
y0 (^ x) = 2. (3)
Given the concavity of y (x), it is clear from a comparison of (3) with (2) that ^ x < xE. This is the
under-investment associated with the hold-up problem, and it re￿ ects the fact that the producer
and supplier bargain over the price of the input after the supplier has already sunk investment in
input supply.
Finally, consider stage 1. If the producer hands the supplier a list of customized input speci￿-
cations, the producer anticipates obtaining a payo⁄ equal to
￿H =
1
2
y (^ x),
which exceeds the payo⁄he would obtain by not providing the speci￿cations (recall that the ex-ante
outside option of producers is equal to 0). Similarly, by agreeing to form a partnership with the
home producer, the supplier anticipates obtaining a payo⁄ of
￿F =
1
2
y (^ x) ￿ ^ x,
which also exceeds his ex-ante outside option.12 In sum, no separations will occur at stage 1. Note
also that the sum of payo⁄s of the two parties is equal to y (^ x) ￿ ^ x, which is strictly less than the
sum of payo⁄s that would obtain when investment is chosen at the e¢ cient level xE de￿ned by (2).
Now consider the measure of social welfare in each country implied by our Benchmark Model.
With our assumption of quasilinear preferences, this measure is given by consumer surplus plus
12Given the concavity of y (x), we have
1
2y (^ x) ￿ ^ x ￿
1
2^ xy
0 (^ x) ￿ ^ x = 0.
8pro￿ts plus trade tax revenue (the latter being zero under free trade).13 Using (1), we have that
country j￿ s demand for good 1 is given by D1(p
j
1) ￿ u0￿1(p
j
1), with consumer surplus then de￿ned
as CSj(p
j
1) ￿
R ￿ p
p
j
1
D1(p)dp where ￿ p is the ￿choke￿price for country j￿ s demand of good 1. World
aggregate welfare may then be represented by
WW = WH + WF = CSH(1) + CSF(1) + ￿H + ￿F = CSH(1) + CSF(1) + y (^ x) ￿ ^ x,
which is strictly lower than world welfare in the presence of production e¢ ciency because y (^ x)￿^ x <
y
￿
xE￿
￿ xE. We summarize this discussion with:
Proposition 1 In the Benchmark Model, a hold-up problem exists under free trade, leading to an
ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (^ x < xE).
Proposition 1 records the existence of a basic international hold-up problem that arises in the
presence of free trade. At this point, there are a variety of mechanism-design resolutions to the
hold-up ine¢ ciencies caused by incomplete contracts that we might consider. However, we view
our international context as one in which these mechanism-design resolutions are naturally more
problematic because they generally rely on the ability of parties to commit not to renegotiate an
initial contract and also on the existence of a third party that can enforce o⁄-the-equilibrium-path
penalties. In this light, trade taxes and subsidies may be particularly useful as an alternative route
to resolving these ine¢ ciencies. We therefore next turn to consider trade intervention as a possible
means of alleviating the hold-up problem.
2.3 Second-Best Trade Policy
In this section, we explore the possible bene￿cial role of trade policy in this distorted economy.
To this end, we let ￿H
x denote the trade tax imposed by H on imports of the input x (positive
if an import tari⁄, negative if an import subsidy) de￿ned in speci￿c terms, and we let ￿F
x be
the analogous trade tax imposed by F (positive if an export tax, negative if an export subsidy).
Furthermore, we let ￿H
1 denote the trade tax imposed by H on the home country￿ s trade in the
￿nal good 1 (positive if an import tari⁄ or export subsidy, negative if an import subsidy or export
tax) also de￿ned in speci￿c terms. Observe that the price of the ￿nal good 1 in H is now given
by pH
1 = 1 + ￿H
1 , whereas the price of the input x continues to be determined by Nash bargaining
between producers and suppliers (though trade taxes may a⁄ect this negotiated price).14
How does the introduction of these trade taxes a⁄ect the equilibrium characterized in the
previous section? To explore this question, we ￿rst consider the case of second-best trade policies,
13Strictly speaking, social welfare should also include a term related to income earned by other factors of production
(say labor) in the economy. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to close the model in a way that makes this term
independent of policies in sector 1 (see, for instance, Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Henceforth, we simply ignore
this term.
14We could also allow for a ￿nal-good trade tax ￿
F
1 in the foreign country, but it is intuitively clear (and is easily
shown) that there will be no incentive to use such an instrument, since such trade taxes could only alter the local
price of good 1 in F (owing to F￿ s small size on world markets) and that price has no impact on the hold-up problem
between F￿ s input suppliers and H￿ s ￿nal good producers.
9that is, the set of policies that maximize aggregate world welfare (subject to the contractual frictions
in producer-supplier relationships). More speci￿cally, we introduce the following stage 0 which
occurs prior to stage 1 of the 4-stage game described in section 2.1:
stage 0. A social planner selects a home-country trade tax ￿H
1 on the ￿nal good 1, a home-country
import tax ￿H
x on home imports of the input x, and a foreign-country export tax ￿F
x on foreign
exports of the input x.
After the social planner has selected these import tari⁄s/subsidies in stage 0, the sequence of
events is as outlined in section 2.1 (with trade taxes collected at the time of importation and
production/sales in stage 4).
Consider now how these trade policy choices in stage 0 a⁄ect the equilibrium outcome of the
game. In their stage-3 bargaining, if the producer and supplier reach an agreement they stand to
obtain a joint payo⁄ of (recalling again that the cost of producing x is sunk at that point)
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x:
A positive import tari⁄ or export subsidy on the ￿nal good (￿H
1 > 0) raises the joint surplus of the
producer and supplier because it raises the price at which the ￿nal good is sold in H. Conversely,
a positive import tari⁄ (￿H
x > 0) or export tax (￿F
x > 0) on inputs reduces the joint surplus of the
producer and supplier because it transfers part of the surplus to governments.
If the producer and the supplier do not reach an agreement, each is again left with a zero outside
option. Hence, both parties obtain a payo⁄ equal to 1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x
￿
in the Nash
bargain of stage 3, and the input supplier￿ s choice of x in stage 2 must then satisfy15
1
2
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
. (4)
It is clear from (4) that ^ x is increasing in ￿H
1 and decreasing in ￿H
x and ￿F
x . Intuitively, incomplete
contracting leads to rent-sharing between the producer and supplier, and the latter￿ s incentives to
invest tend to be higher whenever the surplus from investment is higher, that is when ￿H
1 is higher
and when ￿H
x or ￿F
x are lower. We will see in later sections that the positive dependence of ^ x on ￿H
1
and negative dependence of ^ x on ￿H
x and ￿F
x hold for a variety of speci￿cations of the game played
between the producer and supplier.
At stage 1, the ￿nal-good producer in H anticipates a payo⁄ equal to
￿H =
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
^ x
￿
, (5)
15Implicit in our discussion is the assumption that
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿
H
1
￿
y (x) ￿
￿
￿
H
x + ￿
F
x
￿
x
￿
> 0, so that the Nash bargain
payo⁄ beats each party￿ s outside option. It is straightforward to show that this is true in our Benchmark Model
for the relevant values of home and foreign policies. When we introduce a secondary market in section 5.1, this is
no longer self-evident, and at that point we consider the associated non-negativity constraints (which are formally
treated in Appendix A.2).
10while the supplier in F expects a payo⁄ equal to
￿F =
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
^ x
￿
￿ ^ x, (6)
where ^ x is implicitly de￿ned by (4). As a result, welfare in H, inclusive of tax revenue, is given by
WH = CSH(1 + ￿H
1 ) + ￿H + ￿H
1
￿
D1(1 + ￿H
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)
￿
+ ￿H
x ^ x,
while welfare in F is
WF = CSF(1) + ￿F + ￿F
x ^ x.
We now seek to characterize the set of trade policy choices that maximize world welfare. For-
mally, we are seeking the triplet
￿
￿HE
1 ;￿HE
x ;￿FE
x
￿
that maximizes (see (5) and (6)):
WW = WH + WF = CSH(1 + ￿H
1 ) + CSF(1) +
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ ^ x + ￿H
1
￿
D1(1 + ￿H
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)
￿
,
subject to ^ x being given by (4).16 Notice that for a given value of the sum ￿H
x +￿F
x , the individual
values of ￿H
x and ￿F
x have no e⁄ect on world welfare. This implies that the second-best policies will
only pin down an aggregate input trade tax ￿x ￿ ￿H
x + ￿F
x . The e¢ cient policies ￿HE
1 and ￿E
x are
then determined by the following ￿rst-order conditions of the problem above:17
@WW
@￿H
1
= ￿H
1
@D1
@pH
1
+ [y0 (^ x) ￿ 1]
@^ x
@￿H
1
= 0; and (7)
@WW
@￿x
= [y0 (^ x) ￿ 1]
@^ x
@￿x
= 0.
The ￿rst-order conditions in (7) are instructive. Recalling from (4) that @^ x=@￿H
1 > 0, it is clear
from (7) that the optimal choice of ￿H
1 is strictly positive, provided that [y0 (^ x) ￿ 1] > 0 which
by (2) implies that ^ x < xE: this suggests that an import tari⁄ or export subsidy on trade in the
￿nal good 1 could raise welfare in the world, by increasing ^ x toward xE and thereby helping to
ameliorate the hold-up problem at the cost of lost consumer surplus. However, recalling from (4)
that @^ x=@￿x < 0, it is clear from (7) that the optimal choice of ￿x must ensure that [y0 (^ x)￿1] = 0,
thereby achieving productive e¢ ciency: there is no associated loss in consumer surplus when the
tari⁄ on imported inputs ￿x is used to increase ^ x, and the optimal choice of ￿x therefore solves
completely the hold-up problem and achieves productive e¢ ciency. This in turn leaves no reason
for government intervention with regard to trade in the ￿nal good 1. Hence, the optimal choice of
￿H
1 is ￿HE
1 = 0. On the other hand, the second-best policies do call for intervention with regards
to input trade. In particular, from equation (4) it follows that the optimal trade tax is an input
subsidy in an amount equal to ￿E
x ￿ ￿HE
x + ￿FE
x = ￿1. We may thus state:
16It is the presence of this constraint that leads us to refer to
￿
￿
HE
1 ;￿
HE
x ;￿
FE
x
￿
as second-best trade policy choices,
although we shall show that these policy choices lead to an attainment of the ￿rst-best welfare level.
17It is easily checked that second-order conditions are satis￿ed (see Appendix A.1).
11Proposition 2 In the Benchmark Model, the second-best trade policy choices maintain free trade
in the ￿nal good and subsidize importation of the input so as to solve the hold-up problem and
achieve an e¢ cient volume of input trade (^ x = xE).
The intuition for Proposition 2 is simple. The hold-up problem between producers in H and
suppliers in F results in a level of imported inputs which is ine¢ ciently low. The market failure
is an international one in nature, and thus it is natural that trade taxes or subsidies can serve a
useful role in alleviating the ine¢ ciency. Furthermore, although trade intervention in the ￿nal good
could be used to raise the home-country price of the ￿nal good and increase the volume of imported
inputs (through rent-sharing), this would come at a cost of reduced home-country consumer surplus.
A subsidy to imported inputs does not reduce consumer surplus, but it nevertheless succeeds in
increasing the volume of imported inputs by increasing the surplus over which the parties negotiate
in the ex-post (stage-3) bargain. As a consequence, a subsidy to imported inputs targets just the
distorted margin, and in analogy with the targeting principle (Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963,
Johnson, 1965) is hence the optimal method of addressing the problem.
We have thus identi￿ed a novel role for trade policy intervention, namely, as a means of address-
ing the international hold-up problem that arises when international trade requires relationship-
speci￿c investments between domestic producers and their foreign suppliers. A natural question
is whether the unilateral trade policy choices of both the home and foreign governments will lead
to overall trade interventions that concord with the e¢ ciency conditions outlined in Proposition 2.
We tackle this issue in the next section.
3 Nash Trade Policy and the Role of Trade Agreements
In this section we characterize the Nash policies of the home and foreign governments and evaluate
the potential role of trade agreements in our Benchmark Model. In order to build intuition, we ￿rst
consider the unilaterally optimal trade policy choices of the home government when the foreign
government follows a policy of free trade, and only later consider the possibility of foreign trade
policy intervention.
3.1 Unilateral Home Policy
To characterize the unilaterally optimal trade policy choices of the home government when the
foreign government follows a policy of free trade, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
Benchmark Model for the case in which stage 0 is as follows:18
18Implied by this timing of tari⁄ choices is the assumption that governments can make tari⁄ commitments to the
private sector. If the governments did not have this ability, then as is well known a separate commitment role for
trade agreements might arise (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, Chapter 2, for a review of this literature). The particular
commitment problems that governments face when trade requires relationship-speci￿c investments are emphasized
by Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992) as providing a reason for trade agreements to exist, and by McLaren (1997)
as creating the possibility of perverse negotiating outcomes. Our assumed timing permits us to abstract from the
possible commitment role of trade agreements throughout this paper, so that we may focus on other issues.
12stage 0. The home government H selects a trade tax ￿H
1 on the ￿nal good 1, and a trade tax ￿H
x
on the imported input x; the foreign government F remains passive, i.e., ￿F
x ￿ 0.
Following the same steps as in the last section, and with ￿F
x set to zero at stage 0, we have that
the ￿nal-good producer in H now obtains a stage-2 payo⁄ equal to:
￿H =
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ ￿H
x x
￿
; (8)
where ^ x is now implicitly de￿ned by
1
2
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
￿H
x . (9)
With these expressions in hand, home welfare can be written as the sum of home consumer surplus,
pro￿ts and tax revenue, or
WH = CS(1 + ￿H
1 ) +
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ ￿H
x ^ x
￿
+ ￿H
1 [D1(1 + ￿H
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)] + ￿H
x ^ x.
The optimal choice of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x , which we denote by ^ ￿H
1 and ^ ￿H
x , must maximize home welfare
WH, and will hence satisfy the ￿rst-order conditions
@WH
@￿H
1
= 0 = ￿H
1
@D1
@pH
1
￿
1
2
y (^ x) +
￿
1
2
￿
1 ￿ ￿H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) +
1
2
￿H
x
￿
@^ x
@￿H
1
; and
@WH
@￿H
x
= 0 =
1
2
^ x +
￿
1
2
￿
1 ￿ ￿H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) +
1
2
￿H
x
￿
@^ x
@￿H
x
;
where recall that ^ x is given by equation (9).19 Applying the implicit function theorem (twice) to
(9) delivers
@^ x=@￿H
1
@^ x=@￿H
x
= ￿y0 (^ x),
which can be used to manipulate the above ￿rst-order conditions to obtain:
^ ￿H
1 = ￿
1
2^ x[
y(^ x)
^ x ￿ y0 (^ x)]
j@D1=@pH
1 j
; and (10)
^ ￿H
x = ￿(1 ￿ ^ ￿H
1 )y0 (^ x) ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
:
The expressions in (10) re￿ ect an interesting logic. Part of the goal of the home government
in intervening with ￿H
1 and/or ￿H
x , as in the case of second-best policies, is to raise ^ x towards its
e¢ cient level xE. Nevertheless, the home government does not maximize world welfare and hence
there is an o⁄setting leakage of surplus to the foreign supplier that must be taken into account
19The second-order conditions for this problem do not reduce to simple expressions, as was the case with second-
best policies. In Appendix A.1, we discuss these second-order conditions and show that they are satis￿ed for a simple
parameterized example.
13by the home government in setting its optimal unilateral policies. This leads to two observations:
￿rst, it is not optimal for the home government to deliver the chosen ^ x using only ￿H
x , and the
setting of ￿H
1 6= 0 re￿ ects a new and independent source of international ine¢ ciency associated
with the unilateral policy choices of the home country; and second, it is not optimal for the home
government to raise ^ x all the way to its e¢ cient level xE.
The ￿rst observation can be understood as follows. The home government must concern itself
with two tasks as it considers its policy choices. First, it must face foreign suppliers with the
appropriate marginal incentives for investment in the supply of x so as to achieve the desired
investment level ^ x. Second, the home government must also concern itself with extracting infra-
marginal surplus from foreign suppliers through the use of trade policy instruments.
With its two tari⁄instruments ￿H
1 and ￿H
x , the home government can extract infra-marginal for-
eign surplus with adjustments in ￿H
1 and ￿H
x that hold ^ x ￿xed according to (9), so that d￿H
x (￿H
1 )=d￿H
1 =
￿
@^ x=@￿H
1
@^ x=@￿H
x = y0 (^ x), and can extract foreign surplus in this fashion at the rate
dWF(￿H
1 ;￿H
x ; ^ x)
d￿H
1
jd^ x=0 =
1
2
^ x
￿
y (^ x)
^ x
￿ y0 (^ x)
￿
: (11)
Evidently, with the concavity of y(x) implying [
y(^ x)
^ x ￿ y0 (^ x)] > 0, it follows from (11) that for
any given level of ^ x, additional surplus can be extracted from the foreign country by reducing ￿H
1
and accompanying this with a reduction in ￿H
x which preserves the level of ^ x. Intuitively, while
we have seen that a positive ￿nal-good tari⁄ ￿H
1 could be used to induce greater investment from
foreign suppliers, from the perspective of foreign surplus extraction it is an inferior method for
doing so relative to a subsidy to imported inputs ￿H
x , because ￿H
1 must work through the ￿nal-good
production function y(x) ￿which is concave ￿and this creates more infra-marginal surplus for
foreign suppliers relative to ￿H
x , which works directly (and linearly) through import volume x:
What, then, prevents the home country from lowering ￿H
1 and ￿H
x in this fashion inde￿nitely,
until all of the surplus has been extracted from foreign suppliers? The impact on home-country
welfare of these tari⁄ changes is given by
dWH(￿H
1 ;￿H
x ; ^ x)
d￿H
1
jd^ x=0 = ￿H
1
@DH
1
@pH
1
￿
1
2
^ x
￿
y (^ x)
^ x
￿ y0 (^ x)
￿
: (12)
As (12) makes clear, what eventually stops this process of foreign surplus extraction is the growing
home-country ￿nal-good demand distortions that are associated with ￿H
1 < 0.
It is for these reasons that (10) implies ^ ￿H
1 < 0: in words, it is unilaterally optimal for the
home government to utilize trade policy to distort downward the price of the ￿nal good 1 in the
home market (through either an import subsidy or an export tax on the ￿nal good) as a means
of extracting bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers. Finally, recalling that WW = WH + WF,
14note that (11) and (12) together imply
dWW
d￿H
1
jd^ x=0 = ￿H
1
@DH
1
@pH
1
;
which is strictly positive for ￿H
1 < 0: in words, setting ￿H
1 < 0 is ine¢ cient from the point of view
of aggregate world welfare for any level of ^ x. Hence, our model identi￿es a new and independent
source of international ine¢ ciency when the home country sets its tari⁄s unilaterally: the attempt
to extract bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers by distorting the home market price of the ￿nal
good.
The second observation above, that it is not optimal for the home country to raise ^ x all the
way to its e¢ cient level xE, can be con￿rmed by considering the expression for ^ ￿H
x in (10). This
expression is of indeterminate sign, indicating that ^ ￿H
x can now be either negative (an import
subsidy on inputs of x) or positive (an import tari⁄ on inputs of x): this re￿ ects the tension that
arises for the home-country government between correcting the hold-up problem and capturing
surplus from the foreign input supplier, a tension that was absent in the choice of second-best
policies in section 2.3. To see more formally that the home government will not raise ^ x to the
e¢ cient level, substitute (9) into the expression for ^ ￿H
x in (10) and simplify to obtain
y0 (^ x) = 1 ￿
1
2
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
> 1; (13)
which implies that ^ x < xE. Hence, at least when the foreign government remains passive, it is
unilaterally optimal for the home government to utilize its trade policies in a way that does not
fully correct the international hold-up problem.
We can thus conclude that, when only H intervenes, international e¢ ciency is not achieved.
Instead, there are now two sources of international ine¢ ciency that arise: an ine¢ ciently low input
trade volume that results from the continued existence of the international hold-up problem; and
distortions in the ￿nal good market that arise as a result of the home-country￿ s attempts to extract
bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers. We may thus state:
Proposition 3 In the Benchmark Model, when only H intervenes with trade policy, its unilaterally
optimal policy choices lead to (i) an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (^ x < xE), and (ii) an
ine¢ ciently low local price for the ￿nal good in H￿ s market.
Proposition 3 stands in marked contrast to Proposition 2, and re￿ ects a simple point. To
the extent that home-country producers share part of the surplus from production with foreign
suppliers (as is the case in our Benchmark Model), the unilateral incentives of the home-country
government to intervene with trade policy to mitigate the international hold-up problem will be
muted by the fact that foreign suppliers enjoy some of the bene￿ts of this intervention. In this
environment, the home-country￿ s unilateral intervention must be concerned as well with capturing
foreign surplus, and therefore the home country cannot be counted on to solve the international
15hold-up problem on its own. Moreover, the home-country￿ s attempts to extract bargaining surplus
from foreign suppliers will spill over into the ￿nal good market as well, and introduce additional
distortions there.
3.2 Foreign Intervention and Nash Policy Choices
We turn next to consider the unilateral incentives of the foreign government to intervene with a
trade tax ￿F
x (as before, in a prior stage 0). We hence modify stage 0 as follows:
stage 0. The home government H selects a trade tax ￿H
1 on the ￿nal good 1, and a trade tax ￿H
x
on the imported input x; simultaneously, the foreign government F selects a trade tax ￿F
x on
the exported input x.20
We start by considering F￿ s incentive to intervene facing a given H policy pair
￿
￿H
1 ;￿H
x
￿
. In
this case, the input supplier in F now has a payo⁄ of
￿F =
1
2
(1 + ￿H
1 )y (^ x) ￿ (1 +
1
2
￿H
x +
1
2
￿F
x )^ x;
with ^ x de￿ned by
1
2
(1 + ￿H
1 )y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
￿H
x +
1
2
￿F
x . (14)
Foreign welfare is then given by the sum of foreign consumer surplus, pro￿ts and tax revenue:
WF = CSF(1) +
1
2
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ (1 +
1
2
￿H
x +
1
2
￿F
x )^ x + ￿F
x ^ x.
The optimal choice of ￿F
x , which we denote by ^ ￿F
x , hence must satisfy the ￿rst-order condition
@WF
@￿F
x
= 0 =
1
2
^ x + [
1
2
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) ￿ 1 ￿
1
2
￿H
x +
1
2
￿F
x )]
@^ x
@￿F
x
. (15)
Recalling that @^ x=@￿F
x < 0, the ￿rst-order condition in (15) together with (14) immediately implies
that
￿F
x = ￿
1
2
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
> 0, (16)
and hence, the foreign country ￿nds it optimal to set an export tax on the intermediate input.
The logic behind this result can be understood as follows. First, why doesn￿ t F￿ s government
o⁄er an export subsidy to increase exports of x and help address the hold-up problem? The
reason is that the level of x is already chosen by the foreign supplier to maximize foreign pro￿ts,
and so there is no gain to the foreign country from manipulating this choice with export-sector
intervention. And second, foreign suppliers do not bear the full cost of the increase in the marginal
cost of production associated with an export tax, because they have less than full bargaining power
20As in the case of second-best policies, we could allow for foreign taxes on trade in the ￿nal good 1, but these
have no e⁄ect on the hold-up problem and will thus never be used as a part of an optimal set of policies.
16in their negotiations with ￿nal-good producers. Hence, the foreign government is able to pass part
of the cost of the export tax on to the home country while keeping the entire bene￿t from it (in
the form of tax revenue). As a result, the optimal export tax is positive.
How will the home country respond to the setting of an export tax by F? In order to derive the
Nash policy choices of the home country, we next solve for the ￿nal-good tax ￿H
1 and the input tax
￿H
x that maximize home welfare for a given foreign policy choice ￿F
x . This pair will thus maximize
WH = CS(pH
1 ) +
1
2
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ ￿H
x ^ x ￿ ￿F
x ^ x
￿
+ ￿H
1 [D1(pH
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)] + ￿H
x ^ x
subject to ^ x being given by (14). Manipulating the ￿rst-order conditions and replacing ￿F
x with
^ ￿FN
x ￿ ￿(1=2) ^ x=
￿
@^ x=@￿F
x
￿
yields the following conditions de￿ning the home Nash pair
￿
^ ￿HN
1 ;^ ￿HN
x
￿
:
^ ￿HN
1 = ￿
1
2^ x
h
y(^ x)
^ x ￿ y0 (^ x)
i
j@D1=@pH
1 j
; and
^ ￿HN
x = ￿(1 ￿ ^ ￿HN
1 )y0 (^ x) ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
+ ^ ￿FN
x .
The ￿rst equation implies that ^ ￿HN
1 is again negative, while the second indicates that the sign
of ^ ￿HN
x is indeterminate. This parallels the results we obtain in the case without foreign retaliation
as recorded in (10), and the intuition is the same as that outlined above. The only di⁄erence is the
additional term ^ ￿FN
x > 0 in the second equation, which other things equal leads to overall higher
input taxes. Combining the above expressions for ^ ￿HN
1 and ^ ￿HN
x with equations (14) and (16) we
further obtain:
y0 (^ x) = 1 ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
. (17)
It is then clear that the Nash equilibrium involves suboptimal trade in intermediate inputs, ^ x < xE.
In sum, we have shown that:
Proposition 4 In the Nash equilibrium of the Benchmark Model, F maintains free trade in the
￿nal good and taxes the exports of the input, while H intervenes in both the ￿nal-good and input
markets, resulting in (i) an ine¢ ciently low volume of input trade (^ x < xE), and (ii) an ine¢ ciently
low local price for the ￿nal good in H￿ s market.
3.3 The Role of a Trade Agreement
Proposition 4 characterizes the nature of the ine¢ ciencies that arise in the Nash equilibrium of the
Benchmark Model. If the Nash policy choices are thought to represent the choices that governments
would make in the absence of a trade agreement, then Proposition 4 identi￿es the source of potential
mutual gain from a trade agreement in the presence of o⁄shoring. Evidently, this source has two
distinct dimensions: a ￿rst dimension is to secure the adoption of input trade policies that address
the international holdup problem between H￿ s producers and F￿ s suppliers, and thereby expand
17input trade volume to the internationally e¢ cient level; a second dimension is to secure the adoption
of ￿nal-good trade policies in H that do not distort bargaining between H￿ s producers and F￿ s
suppliers, and thereby raise the local price of the ￿nal good in H￿ s market to the internationally
e¢ cient level.
These observations point to an important insight. When trade involves the o⁄shoring of spe-
cialized components, the source of potential mutual gain from a trade agreement is di⁄erent than
when trade involves the exchange of non-specialized products such as the ￿nal goods traditionally
considered in the literature on trade agreements. The key point is that, in the case of o⁄shoring,
the terms of trade are determined by bilateral bargains between foreign suppliers and domestic
buyers, and this feature gives rise to the two distinct dimensions of potential mutual gain from a
trade agreement described above. By contrast, when trade involves non-specialized products, the
terms of trade are determined by market clearing conditions, and in these circumstances a trade
agreement can o⁄er only one dimension of potential mutual gain: the expansion of trade volume.
More speci￿cally, in the context of ￿nal-goods trade where market clearing determines the terms
of trade, Bagwell and Staiger (2001) have shown that trade agreements exist ￿according to the
￿terms-of-trade theory￿￿for the sole purpose of expanding trade volume to internationally e¢ cient
levels, even when governments have an array of policy instruments that they might potentially
distort. In Appendix B, we extend their result to an input-trade setting analogous to the one
considered here, assuming however that intermediate inputs are not customized to their intended
users, but are rather produced by a competitive fringe of suppliers. In order to open the door for
terms-of trade manipulation, we also let the two countries be large enough in input markets to
a⁄ect world input prices. In the Appendix we establish that, provided the terms at which inputs
are traded internationally is determined by a market-clearing condition (as would naturally be the
case with homogenous inputs), a trade agreement only o⁄ers the ￿rst dimension of potential mutual
gain mentioned above, that of expanding input trade volume to the internationally e¢ cient level.
It is therefore only when the terms of trade are determined by bilateral bargains between foreign
suppliers and domestic buyers ￿as in the case of o⁄shoring of specialized components ￿that a
trade agreement can provide the second dimension of potential mutual gain listed above, namely,
securing the adoption of ￿nal-good trade policies in H that do not distort bargaining between H￿ s
producers and F￿ s suppliers.
Notice, though, that this last observation carries with it a critical implication. When trade
involves the o⁄shoring of specialized components, a trade agreement cannot achieve the interna-
tional e¢ ciency frontier through traditional ￿market access￿negotiations that would simply seek
to establish and maintain appropriate conditions of competition for foreign input suppliers into the
domestic market, or more speci￿cally that would seek to establish appropriate restraints on those
government policies that can alter the conditions of competition. Rather, the agreement must also
cover those government policies that can alter the conditions of bargaining.
To see the distinction, consider the two home tari⁄s ￿H
x and ￿H
1 . When international prices of
traded inputs (the terms at which inputs are traded) are determined by international market clear-
18ing conditions, it is immaterial to foreign input suppliers whether the home government facilitates a
given equilibrium level of input trade by stimulating demand for imported inputs with a relatively
low tari⁄ on imported inputs (￿H
x ) and a relatively low local price for the ￿nal good (through a low
￿nal-good import tari⁄ or export subsidy ￿H
1 ), or rather with a relatively high ￿H
x and a relatively
high local price for the ￿nal good (through a high ￿H
1 ). Either way, with the quantity of home
demand for imported inputs pinned down, the market-clearing international price of the inputs will
be pinned down as well, and hence foreign exporters of inputs can expect to sell the same volume
into the home market at the same price, and hence can expect to receive the same surplus. There-
fore, when the terms at which inputs are traded are determined by international market clearing
conditions, trade negotiations need only be concerned with establishing and maintaining the level
of home market access for foreign input suppliers, not the precise combination of home policies ￿H
x
and ￿H
1 that are used to deliver that access. This implies in turn that, provided negotiations over
￿H
x are understood to imply a market access commitment (and recalling that H is assumed to be
small in world markets for the ￿nal good 1), there is no need for negotiations to cover ￿H
1 .
But when the terms at which inputs are traded are determined by bilateral bargaining, as in
our model of o⁄shoring, this is no longer the case: as we have shown in (11), di⁄erent combinations
of the two home tari⁄s ￿H
x and ￿H
1 will imply di⁄erent levels of surplus for foreign exporters of the
input, even when these di⁄erent combinations lead to the same equilibrium volume of input trade.
Hence, it is no longer enough for trade negotiations to be concerned only with establishing and
maintaining the level of home market access for foreign input suppliers: the negotiations must also
be concerned with the precise combination of home policies ￿H
x and ￿H
1 that are used to deliver
that access. In other words, the agreement must also cover the conditions of bargaining, or more
speci￿cally those government policies that can alter the conditions of bargaining.
In our Benchmark Model, it is the home tari⁄ on the ￿nal good, ￿H
1 , that re￿ ects this new
coverage. More generally, there are many policies ￿including internal/domestic measures ￿that
could potentially alter the conditions of bargaining between foreign suppliers and domestic buyers
of specialized components. The main message here is that the increasing prevalence of o⁄shoring
is likely to complicate the task of a trade agreement, by requiring that it move away from a narrow
focus on market access and toward increasing coverage of a wider array of policy instruments.
We summarize this discussion with:21
Proposition 5 In the Benchmark Model, the role of a trade agreement is to: (i) secure the adoption
of input trade policies that expand input trade volume to the internationally e¢ cient level; and (ii)
secure the adoption of ￿nal-good trade policies in H that raise the local price of the ￿nal good in
H￿ s market to the internationally e¢ cient level.
Since the second role identi￿ed in Proposition 5 only arises when the terms at which inputs are
21Although we have not concerned ourselves with how the trade agreement will divide the surplus between the two
countries, it is worth mentioning that the particular values of ￿
H
x and ￿
F
x can always be chosen to ensure that both
countries are better o⁄ under the agreement than under the status quo with Nash tari⁄s. This in turn implies that
a successful agreement does not require the exchange of lump sum transfers.
19traded is determined by bilateral bargaining, we may also state the following:
Corollary 1 When international trade involves the o⁄shoring of specialized components, an e⁄ec-
tive trade agreement must extend its focus beyond the traditional market access concerns of estab-
lishing and maintaining conditions of competition to cover as well the conditions of bargaining.
4 The Benchmark Model with Political Economy
We have thus far assumed that each country￿ s government is benevolent and seeks to maximize
the aggregate welfare of its residents. Both casual and formal evidence suggest, however, that it
is more realistic to formulate a social welfare function that weights asymmetrically the welfare of
di⁄erent groups in society. The political economy literature has stressed the role of special interest
groups in generating these biases in policy (Baron, 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 1996).
In this section, we extend the Benchmark Model to allow for government welfare functions
that place a higher weight on producer welfare than on consumer welfare. We ￿rst observe that
the introduction of political economy motives can eliminate unrealistic features of the Benchmark
Model￿ s policy predictions (e.g., convert import subsidies to import tari⁄s), but we con￿rm that
the ine¢ ciencies associated with the Nash equilibrium as described in Proposition 4 and the role
of a trade agreement as described in Proposition 5 still apply.
We then consider whether the underlying problem that a trade agreement must address in this
setting can be given a terms-of-trade interpretation along the lines of the (politically augmented)
terms-of-trade theories that feature prominently in the trade-agreements literature. As can be
anticipated from our earlier discussion, the standard terms-of-trade interpretation does not apply
to our model, but we show here that a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation can be given to the
problem that a trade agreement must ￿x as it relates to the input trade policies ￿H
x and ￿F
x ; on the
other hand, we show that this modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation extends to the home ￿nal-
good trade policy ￿H
1 if and only if foreign political economy motives are absent. After establishing
these results, we discuss their relevance for understanding the novel role of trade agreements in the
presence of o⁄shoring.
For simplicity, except where it might cause confusion we continue to refer to the politically
augmented Benchmark Model as simply the Benchmark Model.
4.1 Introducing Political Economy
To represent political-economy motives, we implicitly assume that producers are in a better position
to solve the ￿collective action￿ problem and hence can better coordinate their demands on the
government. We also assume that the ownership of productive assets is highly concentrated, so
that we can ignore the role of producers as consumers and as receivers of lump-sum tax rebates.
In particular, we let:
Wj = CSj + ￿j￿j + Trade Tax Revenuej, with ￿j ￿ 1, for j 2 fH;Fg; (18)
20where ￿j represents the weight that the government of country j places on the welfare of its
producers, with political-economy motives present in country j if and only if ￿j > 1. Using (5),
(6) and (18), the welfare of the home and foreign governments in the (politically augmented)
Benchmark Model can be written as
WH = CS(pH
1 ) + ￿H
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￿
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1 [D1(pH
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+ ￿F
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respectively.22
The ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the Nash policies ^ ￿HN
1 , ^ ￿HN
x , and ^ ￿FN
x can be written as:
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Recalling that, by (14), we have ￿
@^ x=@￿H
1
@^ x=@￿H
x = y0 (^ x), the ￿rst condition in (19) can be derived by
multiplying the condition @WH=@￿H
x = 0 by y0 (^ x) and adding the resulting expression to the
condition @WH=@￿H
1 = 0. We present the Nash conditions in this form in order to facilitate
comparison with the e¢ ciency conditions derived in the next section.
Straightforward manipulation of these ￿rst-order conditions delivers the following expression
for the choice of ￿H
1 :
^ ￿HN
1 = ￿
￿
1 ￿
￿H
2
￿
^ x
h
y(^ x)
^ x ￿ y0 (^ x)
i
j@D1=@pH
1 j
, (20)
which naturally reduces to the analogous equation (10) in the Benchmark Model when ￿H = 1.
Notice that for low enough ￿H (in particular ￿H < 2), the home government continues to ￿nd
it optimal in the Nash equilibrium to set a positive export tax (or import subsidy) on the ￿nal
good. Nevertheless, when the weight that the home government places on producer surplus becomes
su¢ ciently high (i.e., ￿H > 2), ^ ￿HN
1 ￿ ips sign according to (10) and (20) and becomes positive. In
such a case, the home government puts in place a Nash trade policy that leads to an increase in
the domestic price of the ￿nal good (i.e., an import tari⁄ or export subsidy). As we have shown
above, these policies tend to transfer surplus from the home country to the foreign country, but a
su¢ ciently politically in￿ uenced home government is willing to allow this because consumers bear
a disproportionate part of the cost of this rent-dissipation.
22It is straightforward to show that our introduction of political economy into the Benchmark Model does not
create a reason for F to utilize ￿
F
1 , and so we continue to set p
F
1 = 1 and focus only on the choices of ￿
H
1 , ￿
H
x and ￿
F
x .
21Further manipulation of the ￿rst-order conditions also delivers
^ ￿FN
x =
￿
￿F
2 ￿ 1
￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
,
which indicates that for large enough ￿F (in particular ￿F > 2), the foreign government no longer
sets an export tax in the Nash equilibrium but rather chooses to subsidize exports of intermediate
inputs. Intuitively, although a subsidy reduces foreign tari⁄revenue by an amount which is strictly
larger than the amount by which foreign pro￿ts increase, a su¢ ciently politically in￿ uenced foreign
government weights the latter e⁄ect disproportionately more, and thus sets a positive export subsidy
in the Nash equilibrium.
The fact that the magnitude and even the sign of Nash policies are sensitive to political econ-
omy considerations is not particularly surprising: analogous ￿ndings are reported for example in
Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 10). This suggests that the
￿positive￿predictions of our model regarding the types of instruments that governments will use
in equilibrium are not always robust to the presence of political-economy concerns. By the same
token, however, the fact that import subsidies and export taxes are rarely observed in the real world
should not be interpreted as invalidating the empirical relevance of the trade policy ine¢ ciencies
highlighted by our Benchmark Model.
4.2 Politically E¢ cient Policies
In light of the impacts that political economy concerns can have on Nash policies in the Benchmark
Model, a natural question is whether our central results regarding the ine¢ ciency of Nash policies
and the role of trade agreements are robust to the inclusion of political economy considerations. For
instance, as we have observed, a su¢ ciently high weight on home producer surplus (when ￿H > 2)
leads the home government to place an import tari⁄/export subsidy on the ￿nal good, resulting in
a Nash trade policy that raises the domestic price of the ￿nal good: this suggests that the domestic
￿nal good price could therefore be too high in the Nash equilibrium if political economy motives are
su¢ ciently strong. And similarly, it seems possible that the use of export subsidies by the foreign
government (when ￿F > 2) could lead to excessive trade in intermediate inputs.
In order to asses the nature of the ine¢ ciencies associated with Nash equilibrium trade policies
when political economy motives are present, we ￿rst need to characterize the e¢ cient policies in the
presence of political biases. It is straightforward to verify that the e¢ cient policy choices of the two
governments (i.e., the policies ￿x ￿ ￿H
x + ￿F
x and ￿H
1 that maximize the sum of home and foreign
welfare when evaluated in light of the objectives of the governments) must satisfy the following two
22￿rst-order conditions:23;24
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The ￿rst expression in (21) de￿nes the globally e¢ cient level of ￿H
1 for delivering the e¢ cient volume
of input trade ^ x. The second expression in (21) then ensures that ￿x is set so that the volume of
input trade ^ x is indeed e¢ cient.
When political economy motives are absent (￿H = 1 = ￿F), the ￿rst expression in (21) con￿rms
that it is globally e¢ cient to set ￿H
1 = 0 and rely solely on ￿x to achieve the e¢ cient volume of input
trade; the second expression in (21) then implies that it is e¢ cient to set ￿x = ￿1, thereby achieving
y0 (^ x) = 1 and satisfying global e¢ ciency as we have seen earlier. But when political economy
motives are present (￿H > 1 and/or ￿F > 1), the situation is di⁄erent. Most strikingly, according
to the ￿rst expression in (21), e¢ ciency requires ￿H
1 > 0. Evidently, the implied redistribution
from H￿ s consumers to H￿ s producers and F￿ s suppliers which is associated with at least a small
￿H
1 > 0 is valued as long as ￿H > 1 and/or ￿F > 1. This suggests that, in the presence of strong
political economy forces, the Nash choice of ￿H
1 need not be too high relative to its e¢ cient level
simply because those forces are strong enough to imply ^ ￿HN
1 > 0.
In fact, comparing the ￿rst Nash expression in (19) to the ￿rst e¢ ciency condition in (21), it
can be seen that the two expressions are identical except for the absence from (19) of the term
￿
￿F
2
￿
^ x
￿
y (^ x)
^ x
￿ y0 (^ x)
￿
> 0. (22)
Therefore, the ￿rst-order condition that de￿nes the globally e¢ cient level of ￿H
1 for delivering the
e¢ cient volume of input trade ^ x is positive when evaluated at the Nash taxes, and we can thus
conclude that the Nash equilibrium choice of ￿H
1 is ine¢ ciently low, just as in the Benchmark
23De￿ning the e¢ ciency frontier in this way when political economy motives are present ￿ts well with the ￿member-
driven￿nature of the WTO, and it is the approach to evaluating the performance of trade agreements taken by most of
the literature, but it is not the only approach. An alternative (pursued for example by Aghion, Antr￿s, and Helpman,
2007 and by Ornelas, 2008) is to evaluate the performance of trade agreements on the basis of whether or not the
agreement guides governments to a point on an e¢ ciency frontier that is de￿ned with regard to a set of preferences
that are unrelated to government preferences (e.g., the maximization of real world income). Such an approach would
have some potentially interesting implications in the current setting, because politically motivated governments tend
to adopt trade policies that promote producer surplus, and this tends to lead to levels of input production that are
increasing in the political weight ￿. In a world in which input production is too low as a result of hold up, the policy
bias of politically motivated governments could therefore have some attractive consequences from the perspective of
real world income. In principle, governments with a particular set of political preferences could adopt policies in the
Nash equilibrium which deliver e¢ cient levels of input production in the sense of achieving ^ x = x
E. Nevertheless,
in general there is no reason to expect that political pressures would align themselves in this particular way, and so
even from this perspective there would as a general matter be ine¢ ciencies in the Nash equilibrium which a trade
agreement could correct.
24In an analogous fashion to (19), the ￿rst condition in (21) may be derived using (14) by multiplying the condition
@W
W=@￿x = 0 by y
0 (^ x) and adding the resulting expression to the condition @W
W=@￿
H
1 = 0.
23Model.
Similarly, evaluating the second e¢ ciency expression in (21) ￿which de￿nes the globally e¢ cient
level of ￿x and implied volume of input trade ^ x ￿at the Nash taxes, we obtain:
￿
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2 ￿
1
2
￿
￿H + ￿F￿￿
^ x = ￿^ x < 0: (23)
This implies that the Nash level of ￿x is too high ￿and therefore that the input trade volume is
also ine¢ ciently low ￿again just as in the Benchmark Model.
These results con￿rm that the ine¢ ciencies associated with the Nash equilibrium as described
in Proposition 4 and the role of a trade agreement as described in Proposition 5 still apply. In
particular, even when governments are motivated by political-economy concerns, in the presence
of o⁄shoring the role of a trade agreement is to (i) secure the adoption of input trade policies
that expand input trade volume to the internationally e¢ cient level; and (ii) secure the adoption
of ￿nal-good trade policies in H that raise the local price of the ￿nal good in H￿ s market to the
internationally e¢ cient level.
4.3 A Modi￿ed Terms-of-Trade Interpretation
Although we have assumed that both countries are small in world markets, our model of o⁄shoring
has input prices determined by the outcome of bilateral negotiations between producers and sup-
pliers, and thus a government can use trade policy to move the terms of exchange in favor of the
￿rms in its particular country. Viewed from this perspective, the underlying problem that leads
to the ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed in Proposition 4 ￿and therefore that determines the role of a trade
agreement in the presence of o⁄shoring according to Proposition 5 ￿thus appears to be closely
related to the underlying problem identi￿ed by the terms-of-trade theory, even though as we have
con￿rmed in the Corollary 1 to Proposition 5 there are some important di⁄erences in the nature
of the ine¢ ciencies that result. We now explore further the link with the terms-of-trade theory,
in order to make precise where our model can and cannot be given a (modi￿ed) terms-of-trade
interpretation.
To this end, we begin by de￿ning the international price of the input x, which we denote by p￿
x.
In words, p￿
x is the (untaxed) price negotiated in stage 3 for the exchange of inputs between the
foreign supplier and the home producer. It is easy to see that in the Benchmark Model this price
is given by p￿
x = ￿F=^ x + (1 + ￿F
x ), which can be written as
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; (24)
where, for notational ease, we suppress the dependence of ^ x on ￿H
1 , ￿H
x and ￿F
x indicated by (14).
Of particular interest are the impacts of trade policies on the international price of x when
the equilibrium volume of input trade ^ x is held ￿xed. From (24), it is direct to con￿rm that
these impacts are given by the partial derivatives @p￿
x=@￿H
1 = 1
2y (^ x)=^ x, @p￿
x=@￿H
x = ￿1
2 and
24@p￿
x=@￿F
x = 1
2. Notice that, when the home government reduces ￿H
1 , the pure international rent
shifting it accomplishes can then be written, using these partial derivatives, as ^ x ￿ @p￿
x=@￿H
1 , and
when it increases ￿H
x the associated rent shifting is given by ￿^ x ￿ @p￿
x=@￿H
x . Similarly, when the
foreign government increases ￿F
x , the pure international rent shifting is given by ^ x￿@p￿
x=@￿F
x . These
magnitudes are of interest because they isolate the ￿bad￿￿i.e., pure rent-shifting ￿impacts that
intervention can have on the terms of trade from the ￿good￿ impacts that are associated with
bringing the equilibrium volume of input trade ^ x up to internationally e¢ cient levels.25
We now borrow terminology from Bagwell and Staiger (1999), and de￿ne politically optimal
policies as those policies that would hypothetically be chosen by governments unilaterally if (i) the
home government placed zero value on the shifting of foreign surplus (^ x￿@p￿
x=@￿H
1 ) that it achieves
with a decrease in ￿H
1 ; (ii) the home government placed zero value on the shifting of foreign surplus
(￿^ x ￿ @p￿
x=@￿H
x ) that it achieves with an increase in ￿H
x ; and (iii) the foreign government placed
zero value on the shifting of home surplus (^ x ￿ @p￿
x=@￿H
x ) that it achieves with an increase in ￿F
x .
With politically optimal tari⁄s de￿ned in this way, we may ask whether politically optimal tari⁄s
are e¢ cient, and thereby explore whether the Nash ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed in Proposition 4 can
be given a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation, according to which the fundamental problem
faced by governments in designing their trade agreement is to ￿nd ways to eliminate the ￿bad￿
terms-of-trade manipulation while maintaining/encouraging the ￿good,￿and in so doing play the
role identi￿ed in Proposition 5.
Using (24), the ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the politically optimal policies ^ ￿HPO
1 , ^ ￿HPO
x ,
and ^ ￿FPO
x can be written as:26
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By evaluating the second e¢ ciency expression in (21) ￿which recall de￿nes the globally e¢ cient
level of ￿x and implied volume of input trade ^ x ￿at the politically optimal policies de￿ned by (25),
it is direct to con￿rm that ￿PO
x ￿ ^ ￿HPO
x + ^ ￿FPO
x is indeed e¢ cient. Hence we have:
25Formally, with the local price of x in the home country de￿ned as p
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With W
H expressed this way, the ￿bad￿terms-of-trade impacts of a slight increase in ￿
H
x referred to in the text are
given by
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26The ￿rst condition in (25) may be derived in an analogous fashion to that in (19) and (21) ￿see note 24.
25Proposition 6 In the Benchmark Model, the international ine¢ ciency associated with the Nash
choices of input tari⁄s can be given a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation: with regard to input
tari⁄s, the role of a trade agreement is to eliminate the ￿bad￿terms-of-trade manipulation associated
with the pursuit of pure international rent-shifting while maintaining the ￿good￿ terms-of-trade
manipulation inherent in the internationally e¢ cient subsidies to input trade.
We next assess the e¢ ciency properties of the politically optimal choice of Home￿ s ￿nal-good
tari⁄ ^ ￿HPO
1 . Comparing the ￿rst politically optimal expression in (25) to the ￿rst e¢ ciency condi-
tion in (21), it can be seen that the two expressions are identical except for the absence from (25)
of the term ￿
￿F ￿ 1
2
￿
￿
￿
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^ x
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which is positive if and only if ￿F > 1. Therefore, the ￿rst-order condition that de￿nes the globally
e¢ cient level of ￿H
1 for delivering the e¢ cient volume of input trade ^ x is satis￿ed when evaluated
at the political optimum ￿and we can thus conclude that the politically optimal choice of ￿H
1
is e¢ cient ￿if and only if ￿F = 1, so that the foreign government is not motivated by political
economy concerns. This implies in turn that the ine¢ ciency associated with the Nash choice of ￿H
1
cannot be given a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation when the foreign government is politically
motivated.
Hence, we have:
Proposition 7 In the Benchmark Model, the international ine¢ ciency associated with the home
government￿ s Nash choice of ￿nal-good tari⁄ can be given a modi￿ed terms-of-trade interpretation
if and only if the foreign government is not motivated by political economy considerations.
By contrast, as we con￿rm in Appendix B, politically optimal tari⁄s are e¢ cient regardless of
political economy considerations when input prices are determined by an international market
clearing condition.27
Proposition 7 carries with it an important implication: in our model of o⁄shoring, the underlying
problem that gives rise to the ine¢ ciencies which a trade agreement seeks to resolve becomes more
complicated when governments possess political economy motives. In this sense, our model formally
identi￿es a separate ￿political externality￿for a trade agreement to address, somewhat along the
lines described in Ethier (2004).28 This is in stark contrast to the terms-of-trade theory, where the
presence or absence of political economy motives has no impact on the underlying problem that a
trade agreement must solve.
27Note also that, as is re￿ ected in our discussion, it is the foreign political economy forces that prevent the
politically optimal choice of ￿
H
1 from being e¢ cient. More generally, however, in the presence of symmetric home-
supplier/foreign-producer relationships, political economy forces in either country will interfere with the e¢ ciency
properties of the political optimum.
28As Ethier (2004, p. 305) puts it, ￿ ￿ Political externalities,￿by my de￿nition, arise when policymakers in one
country believe that their political status (whatever that might be speci￿ed to mean) is directly sensitive, to some
degree, to actions by policymakers in another country.￿See also Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Chapter 2) for a further
discussion of these ideas.
26The essential di⁄erence between the terms-of-trade theory and our theory of o⁄shoring that
accounts for this distinction is related to the result reported in the Corollary 1 to Proposition 5,
and can again be traced to the di⁄erence across the two theories in the way that international
prices are determined. According to the terms-of-trade theory, international prices are determined
through market clearing conditions, with local prices in each economy then determined by arbitrage
conditions that link international prices to local prices through a country￿ s own policies. When
countries choose politically optimal policies according to the terms-of-trade theory, they therefore
ensure that the local-price e⁄ects of small adjustments in the policies of their trading partners
can have no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on their welfare, because these local price e⁄ects could already have
been generated by their own policy adjustments, and the ￿rst-order-conditions that de￿ne their
politically optimal policies ensure that these welfare impacts are zero (see Appendix B for details).
By contrast, in our theory of o⁄shoring, international prices are determined by bilateral bargaining
between foreign suppliers and home producers, and given the more complex channels through which
a trading partner￿ s policies can induce local e⁄ects in a country￿ s economy, the ￿rst-order conditions
that determine a country￿ s politically optimal policies cannot ￿except for the special case in which
governments maximize real national income ￿ensure that the welfare e⁄ects will be zero, because
there is no longer any guarantee that the local e⁄ects of a trading partner￿ s policy adjustments
could have been generated by a country￿ s own policy adjustments.
Notice also that this ￿nding reinforces an observation we made earlier, that the increasing
prevalence of o⁄shoring is likely to complicate the task of a trade agreement. Here, the complication
is associated with the interaction between o⁄shoring and political economy forces: as Proposition
7 indicates, when these two elements are present, the underlying problem that a trade agreement
must address varies with the political preferences of member governments. As a consequence,
under the view that governments operate in the presence of important political economy forces,
the increasing prevalence of o⁄shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to
rely on simple and general rules ￿such as reciprocity and non-discrimination ￿to help them solve
their trade-related problems.
5 Sensitivity
In this section we consider the generality of our central ￿ndings to various alternative modeling
assumptions. For simplicity, we return to a setting in which governments do not possess political
economy motives.
5.1 General Bargaining Power
In the Benchmark Model we have assumed that all bargaining between home producers and foreign
suppliers is characterized by symmetric Nash bargaining, with each party capturing one-half of the
ex-post gains from trades. We have also assumed that the lack of an ex-post contractual agreement
leaves both parties with no time to attempt to transact with alternative producers, and thus the
27outside options in the bargaining are equal to 0. We now explore the robustness of our results
to more general bargaining assumptions. Below we consider the case of general bargaining power
and the introduction of a secondary market for inputs in H. In Appendix A.3, we also consider
the possibility that the secondary market for the foreign supplier is located in the foreign country.
In each case, we show that helping governments solve the international hold-up problem between
producers and suppliers and avoid the policy distortions that would be introduced by attempts to
extract bargaining surplus from foreign ￿rms remain the fundamental purposes of a trade agreement
in the model.
In order to explicitly derive the payo⁄s associated with the secondary market we now assume
that good 1 comes in two types, a customized type T and a generic type G, and that consumer
preferences are given by
Uj = c
j
0 + u
￿
c
j
1T + ￿c
j
1G
￿
, 0 < ￿ < 1. (27)
Note that the preferences in (27) are such that consumers are willing to buy both types of good
1 only if the price of the generic relative to that of the customized type is equal to ￿. This is
analogous to consumers perceiving the two goods as perfect substitutes up to a quality shifter. By
an appropriate choice of units, we can set the (￿xed) price of customized inputs on world markets
equal to 1, and that of generic inputs to ￿.
The technology for producing ￿nal goods and intermediate inputs is as in our Benchmark Model.
The only di⁄erence between the two types of good 1 is that the production of a generic good G
uses an intermediate input x that is not customized to the producer￿ s needs.
The game we consider is a straightforward extension to that in our Benchmark Model that
incorporates a secondary market for inputs and generalized Nash bargaining. The sequence of
events is as follows:
stage 1. The unit measure of producers in H and suppliers in F are randomly matched, producing
a unit measure of matches. Each agent decides whether to stay with his match or exit the
market. In the former case, the producer provides the supplier with a list of customized input
speci￿cations. In the latter case, each producer obtains his ex-ante outside option (equal to
zero).
stage 2. Each supplier decides on the amount x of customized input to be produced (at marginal
cost of 1) ￿ the marginal cost of production for a generic input (not customized to the
matched producer￿ s needs) is the same, so there is no bene￿t in not customizing the input
for the matched producer at this point.
stage 3. Each producer-supplier pair bargains over the price of the intermediate input. We con-
sider the generalized Nash bargaining solution with weights ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) for the home
producer and foreign supplier, respectively, where ￿ 2 (0;1).
stage 4. A small number (formally, a measure-zero countable in￿nity) n of the bilateral pairs are
exogenously dissolved and randomly rematched in a secondary market. They bargain again
28according the same generalized Nash bargaining solution as in stage 3. No further inputs can
be produced; the amount produced in stage 2 is perceived as generic in the secondary market
because it was tailored to another producer￿ s speci￿cations with probability one.
stage 5. Each producer in H imports x from its partner-supplier and produces the ￿nal good with
the acquired x, and payments agreed in stages 3 and 4 are settled.
We focus directly on deriving Nash policy choices, assuming as before that the home and for-
eign governments select their respective tari⁄s simultaneously in a prior stage 0. Note that given
the speci￿cation of the secondary market in stage 4, it is easy to see that the breakup of a single
bargaining pair in stage 3 would result in each member of the pair being rematched with probabil-
ity 1 with a random partner in stage 4, and therefore that stage 4 implies an outside option equal to
￿
￿
￿
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x
￿
for the ￿nal-good producer and (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x
￿
for the supplier. These expressions are valid provided they are non-negative, and here and through-
out this section we characterize results for the case where these non-negativity constraints are non-
binding. In Appendix A.2 we consider the cases where a non-negativity constraint is binding (so
that the associated payo⁄ is zero), and show that our qualitative results carry through for those
cases as well.29
Following analogous steps as in previous sections, it is easy to see that generalized Nash bar-
gaining in stage 3 will leave the ￿nal-good producer in H with a payo⁄ equal to ￿
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x)￿
￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x; with the supplier in F now receiving a stage-3 payo⁄ of (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿H
1 )y (x) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿H
x + ￿F
x )x: As a result, we have that the stage-2 choice of ^ x is now de￿ned by
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿H
1 )y0 (^ x) = 1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
; (28)
and hence the stage-1 payo⁄s of the home and foreign ￿rm are given by
￿H = ￿
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
^ x; and
￿F = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿H
1 )y (^ x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿H
x + ￿F
x )^ x ￿ ^ x:
Home and foreign welfare may now be written as
WH = CS(pH
1 ) + ￿H + ￿H
1 [D1(pH
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)] + ￿H
x ^ x; and
WF = CS(1) + ￿F + ￿F
x ^ x: (29)
The ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the Nash policies ^ ￿HN
1 , ^ ￿HN
x , and ^ ￿FN
x can be manipulated
29Beyond determining outside options, stage 4 plays no role in the model, and in particular only the customized
type of good 1 will be produced with positive measure in equilibrium.
29using (28) to yield30
^ ￿HN
1 = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ x
h
y(^ x)
^ x ￿ y0 (^ x)
i
j@D1=@pH
1 j
;
^ ￿HN
x = ￿
￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿HN
1
￿
y0 (^ x)
(1 ￿ ￿)
+
￿^ ￿FN
x
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
; and
^ ￿FN
x = ￿￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
:
By setting ￿ = 1=2, it is easily veri￿ed that these expressions coincide with those of the Benchmark
Model above, where symmetric Nash bargaining and the absence of a secondary market for inputs
was assumed. Considering the case of generalized Nash bargaining allows us to illustrate how the
Nash equilibrium policy choices of governments are a⁄ected by conditions of ex-post bargaining
between foreign suppliers and domestic producers. For instance, the extent to which the Foreign
country wants to use export taxes to extract revenue from Home producers is tightly related to
their bargaining power; in fact, a prerequisite for export taxes to be used by the foreign country is
for this country￿ s suppliers to have weak (or at least less-than-complete) bargaining power in the
market for inputs.31
Leaving aside the di⁄erences that the speci￿cs of the bargaining process make to the equilibrium
Nash policy choices, we emphasize two general results that continue to hold regardless of the value
of ￿. First, the international hold-up problem persists and the volume of international input trade
is ine¢ ciently low as a consequence. To see this, one can manipulate the ￿rst-order conditions and
use the expression for @^ x=@￿H
x and @^ x=@￿F
x implied by (28) to derive
y0 (^ x) = 1 ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
> 1;
which implies that ^ x < xE. Second, it is evident that ^ ￿HN
1 < 0 for ￿ < 1, and so our model
continues to predict that there are distortions in the ￿nal good market (pH
1 is too low) that arise
as a result of the home-country￿ s attempts to extract bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers.
The purpose of a trade agreement therefore remains to help governments better solve these two
30Throughout the extension section, we simply assume that second-order conditions are met.
31In fact what is key is that foreign suppliers have less than full bargaining power in the secondary market for
inputs. To see this, consider the case in which there is generalized Nash bargaining in both stages 3 and 4, but
with potentially di⁄erent bargaining weights ￿P and ￿S, respectively. In such a case, the Nash tari⁄ choices are
characterized by the following conditions:
^ ￿
HN
1 =
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿) ^ x[y
0 (^ x) ￿
y(^ x)
^ x ]
￿@D1=@pH
1
;
^ ￿
HN
x = ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)^ ￿
HN
1
￿
y
0 (^ x)
(1 ￿ ￿S)
+
￿S^ ￿
FN
x
(1 ￿ ￿S)
￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
; and
^ ￿
FN
x = ￿￿S
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
;
where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿S￿ + ￿P (1 ￿ ￿). It is apparent that ^ ￿
FN
x > 0 only if ￿S > 0:
30problems, just as in our Benchmark Model.32
It is also possible to use the extended model developed in this section to make a broader point.
Up to now we have not taken a stance as to whether the home producer and foreign supplier
are vertically related or not. According to the transaction-cost approach to the boundaries of
the ￿rm (c.f., Coase, 1936, Williamson, 1985), vertical integration would arise precisely when the
hold-up ine¢ ciencies that we have modelled above become large relative to the larger ￿governance￿
costs of running an integrated organization. According to that view, our novel rationale for trade
agreements would disappear because production of the ￿nal good could then be characterized
by neoclassical production theory.33 Nevertheless, the property-rights approach to the theory of
the ￿rm (c.f., Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) has persuasively argued that
￿rm boundaries are better understood as determining the relative bargaining power of producers
(via the allocation of residual rights of control inherent in the ownership of productive physical
assets) rather than as a⁄ecting the space of contracts available to economic agents. Under this
interpretation, the rationale for trade agreements that we propose in this paper would very much
apply to vertically integrated cross-border production relationships. A crude way to capture the
essence of the property-rights theory of the ￿rm in terms of the extended model developed in this
section would be to associate international outsourcing relationships with a low value of ￿ (the
bargaining power of home producers) as compared to the value of ￿ applying to international
insourcing relationships. With this interpretation, our ￿nding that the fundamental purpose of
a trade agreement does not depend on the value of ￿ then suggests as well that the presence or
absence of vertical integration would not alter the fundamental purpose of a trade agreement.34
5.2 Ex-Ante Lump-Sum Transfers
Our Benchmark Model rules out ex-ante lump-sum transfers between home producers and foreign
suppliers. Although this seems a plausible assumption in our international framework where the
promises associated with these transfers may be hard to enforce, it is useful to study the robustness
of our results to this assumption. For that purpose, we consider the following modi￿cation of stage
1 of our Benchmark Model:
stage 1. The unit measure of producers in H and suppliers in F are randomly matched, producing
a unit measure of matches. Each producer in H and its matched supplier in F bargain over
32It is interesting to note that for the limiting case of ￿ = 1, we have ^ ￿
HN
1 = 0 and so the ￿nal-good market distor-
tions associated with Nash policies disappear. This re￿ ects the fact that the home ￿rm has full stage-3 bargaining
power when ￿ = 1, and so the home government has no reason to distort ￿
H
1 for the purposes of extracting bargaining
surplus from foreign ￿rms in this limiting case.
33This assumes that home producers could hire foreign suppliers in a competitive market at a given price, which
is consistent with the transaction-cost assumption of a frictionless integrated structure (see Grossman and Helpman,
2002, for a general equilibrium treatment).
34This is not to say that the presence or absence of vertically integrated home producers and foreign suppliers would
be irrelevant for the nature of trade agreements. On the contrary, to the extent that international factor ownership
associated with vertically integrated multinational ￿rms alters the objective functions of each government, the nature
of trade agreements could be very much a⁄ected (see Blanchard, 2006). Rather, our point is simply that vertical
integration does not by itself obviate the need for a trade agreement to address the international hold-up problem.
31whether to continue their relationship or not and lump-sum transfers are allowed in the
bargaining. This stage-1 bargaining is captured by the generalized Nash bargaining solution
with weights ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) for the home producer and foreign supplier, respectively, where
￿ 2 (0;1). If the relationship is terminated, both ￿rms exit; if an agreement is reached, the
producer retains the supplier and provides it with a list of customized input speci￿cations.
For simplicity, we assume that the remaining stages of the game are as in the Benchmark
Model (and, in particular, all ex-post bargains are governed by symmetric Nash bargaining). This
implies that at stage 1, the home producer and the foreign supplier anticipate that if they reach
an agreement, they stand to obtain a joint payo⁄ of
￿H + ￿F =
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
^ x ￿ ^ x,
where ^ x is given by
1
2
(1 + ￿H
1 )y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
.
Instead, if an agreement is not reached, both ￿rms exit and are left with a payo⁄ equal to 0. In
Appendix A.2, we show that ￿H + ￿F > 0, which implies that all pairs reach an agreement at
stage 1. Note, however, that because of the lump-sum transfers, the division of pro￿ts between
home producers and foreign suppliers is now detached from the ex-post bargaining solution.35 In
particular, we have:
￿H = ￿
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ (￿H
x + ￿F
x )^ x ￿ ^ x
￿
; and
￿F = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ (￿H
x + ￿F
x )^ x ￿ ^ x
￿
:
The values of home and foreign welfare are still given by equation (29) with the new pro￿t levels
￿H and ￿F applying.
We can next turn to study the Nash equilibrium policy choices of this variant of the model with
lump-sum transfers. Manipulating the ￿rst-order conditions related to the choices of ^ ￿HN
1 , ^ ￿HN
x ,
and ^ ￿FN
x delivers:
^ ￿HN
1 = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ^ x
h
y(^ x)
x ￿ y0 (^ x)
i
j@D1=@pH
1 j
;
^ ￿HN
x = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
￿ ￿ + ^ ￿HN
1 y0 (^ x); and
^ ￿FN
x = ￿￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
￿ (1 ￿ ￿).
Again we emphasize two general results that continue to hold for any ￿ 2 (0;1). First, the
international hold-up problem persists and the volume of international input trade is ine¢ ciently
35Still, the equilibrium level of ^ x will be identical to that in the Benchmark Model, since foreign suppliers choose
^ x to maximize ex-post payo⁄s (thus ignoring ex-ante payments).
32low as a consequence. To see this, one can manipulate the ￿rst-order conditions to derive
y0 (^ x) = 1 ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
> 1;
which again implies that ^ x < xE. Second, it is evident that ^ ￿HN
1 < 0 for ￿ < 1, and so our model
continues to predict that there are distortions in the ￿nal good market (pH
1 is too low) that arise as
a result of the home-country￿ s attempts to extract bargaining surplus from foreign suppliers. Once
again therefore, the purpose of a trade agreement remains to help governments better solve these
two problems, just as in our Benchmark Model.36
5.3 Multiple Foreign Countries and Search Costs
Our analysis has been restricted to situations in which home producers can only search for suppliers
in F. It is straightforward to show that at least some of our results could be overturned when this
restriction is relaxed. To illustrate this in the starkest possible way, we consider again the variant of
the Benchmark Model described in the previous section, with lump-sum ex-ante transfers available
to producers.
Let us focus on the limiting case in which home producers have full bargaining power, that
is ￿ = 1. In such a case, we have ^ ￿HN
1 = 0 and ^ ￿HN
x = ￿1, which indicate that if the foreign
government followed a policy of free trade, the Nash equilibrium policies would coincide with the
second-best ones and there would be no need for a trade agreement. The intuition is straightforward:
the home government would in such a case be internalizing the whole gains from trade, and thus its
policy choices would coincide with those of a world social planner facing the same constraints on the
choice of ^ x. But the foreign government will not remain passive, and in fact sets a positive export
tax equal to ^ ￿FN
x = ￿^ x=
￿
@^ x=@￿F
x
￿
> 0, which is equivalent to the export tax that maximizes export
tax revenue ￿F
x ^ x. The logic is as follows: absent government intervention, foreign input suppliers
gain nothing from their bilateral relationships with home ￿nal good producers when ￿ = 1, and as
a consequence welfare in F is una⁄ected by the hold-up problem. This gives the foreign government
no incentive to intervene to try to ￿x the problem. Instead, as the foreign government can commit
to an export policy before its suppliers are matched with producers in the home country (i.e., before
stage 1), its only goal is to collect maximal trade tax revenue from the exportation of x, because
the incidence of its tax is borne completely by ￿nal good producers in H (through a reduction in
the transfer that can be extracted from the foreign supplier by the domestic producer).
Hence, even in this limiting case of the Benchmark Model extended to permit lump-sum ex-ante
transfers, international e¢ ciency is not reached. Notice, though, that it is not reached because the
foreign government has an incentive to set a positive export tax in that case.
Now consider the case in which there is a second ￿foreign￿country, denoted by S for ￿South,￿
36As with the case of stage-3 bargaining power discussed in note 32, in the limiting case of ￿ = 1, we have ^ ￿
HN
1 = 0
and so the ￿nal-good market distortions associated with Nash policies disappear. This re￿ ects the fact that the home
￿rm has full stage-1 bargaining power when ￿ = 1, and so the home government has no reason to distort ￿
H
1 for the
purposes of extracting bargaining surplus from foreign ￿rms in this limiting case.
33with an additional unit measure of potential suppliers identical to those in F. Assume that F and
S are identical in every other respect, including preferences, technology and bargaining strength.
Under these circumstances and as long as ￿F
x > ￿S
x, all home producers will prefer to match with
southern suppliers over suppliers in F. As a result, the government in F will have an incentive to
reduce its export tax below the southern one. Pushing this argument further, it is straightforward
to show then that the optimal foreign and southern export taxes that emerge from this variant of
the model are 0.37 As a result, in this extended variant of the Benchmark Model, home producers
internalize the whole gains from the o⁄shoring relationship, and the home government chooses the
￿rst-best policies described in Proposition 2. The rationale for a trade agreement in this extended
variant of the Benchmark Model has vanished.
This example, however, is special in a number of ways. To begin with, the assumption that
F and S are symmetric is not innocuous: if one of the two foreign countries has a comparative
advantage in supplying inputs, it can (and will) maintain a positive export tax (analogous to ￿limit
pricing￿in the case of Bertrand competition among ￿rms), and the result of our Benchmark Model is
then preserved. More importantly, the structure of the example above imposes that home producers
￿nd a match with probability one, no matter where they search for suppliers. As emphasized by
Grossman and Helpman (2005), an important feature of o⁄shoring relationships is the costly search
for suitable partners. The same characteristics that make o⁄shoring relationships contractually
di¢ cult (i.e., customization, international enforceability of contracts, etc.) preclude the existence
of a frictionless competitive market for inputs or for suppliers.
To bring these issues into our analysis in a simple way, we now assume that F contains a measure
￿ of potential suppliers, while S contains a measure 1￿￿. If k home producers search for matches in
F, the total measure of successful matches is given by the matching function m(k;￿) ￿ minfk;￿g,
where m(￿) is increasing in both arguments and features constant returns to scale. For simplicity,
we assume that S adopts a laissez-faire policy. Will this force F to give up the use of an export
tax? As we now demonstrate, the answer is ￿No.￿
To show this, we begin by noting that, for home producers to be indi⁄erent between searching
in F and in S, we need:
m(k;￿)
k
￿
y
￿
^ xF￿
￿ ￿F
x ^ xF￿
=
m(1 ￿ k;1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ k
y
￿
^ xS￿
, (30)
where ^ xF is such that y0 ￿
^ xF￿
= 1 + ￿F
x , while ^ xS is such that y0 ￿
^ xS￿
= 1. Equation (30) de￿nes a
negative relationship between k and ￿F
x : intuitively, an increase in the foreign export tax should be
matched by an increase in the probability of ￿nding a match in that country, which in turn requires
a decrease in the measure of home producers searching for partners in that country. To see this
formally, note that using the assumption of constant-return-to scale in the matching function, we
37The logic is analogous to that behind the fact that Bertrand competition implies marginal-cost pricing.
34can write:
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where ￿(￿=k) ￿ m(1;￿=k) and thus ￿0 (￿=k) > 0.
In order to explore the implications of this framework for the optimal choice of an export tax
in F, we ￿rst de￿ne welfare in F as the sum of consumer surplus and tari⁄ revenue collected from
all the matched bilateral pairs:
WF = CS (1) + m(k;￿)￿F
x ^ xF.
It thus follows that the optimal choice of ￿F
x (denoted ^ ￿F
x ) will now satisfy:
@WF
@￿F
x
=
@m(k;￿)
@k
dk
d￿F
x
￿F
x ^ xF + m(k;￿) ^ xF + m(k;￿)￿F
x
@^ xF
@￿F
x
= 0,
which in turn implies:
^ ￿F
x =
^ xF
￿@^ xF
@￿F
x ￿
@m(k;￿)
@k
1
m(k;￿)
dk
d￿F
x ^ xF
> 0.
In sum, provided that dk
d￿F
x remains bounded, the optimal export tax will be positive. It is
straightforward to show that for well-behaved matching functions, the export tax will remain posi-
tive even for in￿nitesimally small countries. In particular, notice from equation (30) that whenever
the elasticity of m(￿) with respect to both of its arguments is positive, we will have that when
￿ ! 0, and hence as F becomes in￿nitesimally small, dk
d￿F
x goes to 0 as well, and thus
^ ￿F
x !
^ xF
￿@^ xF=@￿F
x
;
which corresponds to the expression derived in the previous section (and evaluated at ￿ = 1) when
only F is the source of inputs.38
Arguing in this general fashion, it can be seen that the central ￿ndings of our Benchmark Model
are robust to the introduction of multiple foreign countries where inputs may be sourced and the
associated matching frictions that would naturally arise in this setting.
5.4 Ad Valorem Tari⁄s
We next return to the Benchmark Model but depart from the speci￿c tari⁄analyzed in the previous
sections, and consider instead an ad-valorem import tari⁄ on intermediate inputs. We show here
that ad valorem tari⁄s introduce a novel channel through which bargaining between the home
38In particular, under the maintained assumptions,
￿￿0(￿=k)
k￿(￿=k) is positive and bounded below 1, while
(1￿￿)￿0((1￿￿)=(1￿k))
￿(￿=k) goes to in￿nity when ￿ ! 0.
35producer and foreign supplier can be a⁄ected. Despite this novel channel, however, we con￿rm that
the role played by an international trade agreement remains the same.
To this end, with the ￿international￿(foreign exporter) price p￿
x still denoting the price negoti-
ated in stage 3 for the exchange of intermediate inputs between the foreign supplier and the home
producer, we now let tH
x and tF
x denote, respectively, the home-country and foreign-country taxes
on trade in the intermediate good x expressed in ad valorem terms. With this notation we highlight
explicitly that the stage-3 negotiation between producer and supplier divides surplus between them
by agreeing on the price at which the foreign supplier sells the x units of intermediate input to the
home producer.
As will become clear, the novel aspects that arise when tari⁄s take an valorem rather than
speci￿c form apply only to input tari⁄s; nothing substantive changes if the ￿nal good tari⁄s are
expressed in ad valorem terms. Therefore, to focus on the novel aspects of ad valorem tari⁄s, we
now ignore tari⁄s on the ￿nal good and set ￿H
1 = ￿F
1 ￿ 0. With this assumption, according to the
Benchmark Model there would be only one problem for a trade agreement to solve in the presence
of speci￿c tari⁄s on trade in the intermediate input x, namely, the elimination of the international
hold-up problem, and we now con￿rm that this remains the case when the tari⁄s take an ad valorem
form.
Speci￿cally, if the producer and supplier reach an agreement in their stage-3 bargaining that
speci￿es a price level ~ p￿
x, then the home-country producer receives a stage-3 payo⁄ of !H = y(x)￿
(1 + tH
x )~ p￿
xx while the foreign supplier receives a stage-3 payo⁄ of !F =
~ p￿
x
(1+tF
x )x. Notice that this
implies a bargaining frontier de￿ned by !H = y(x) ￿ (1 + tH
x )(1 + tF
x )!F: because the level of the
exporter price p￿
x is used by the home producer and foreign supplier to shift surplus between them,
a positive ad valorem import tari⁄or export tax makes the slope of the bargaining frontier between
the home producer and the foreign supplier steeper, while a negative ad valorem tari⁄ (an import
or export subsidy) makes the slope of the bargaining frontier ￿ atter.39 In e⁄ect, then, ad valorem
trade taxes penalize the producer and supplier for shifting surplus toward the foreign supplier (with
a high p￿
x), while ad valorem trade subsidies encourage surplus-shifting in this direction, suggesting
a novel channel through which ad valorem trade taxes can a⁄ect the severity of the international
hold-up problem. This channel is not present when a speci￿c tari⁄ is instead utilized, because the
slope of the bargaining frontier between producer and supplier is ￿1 independent of the level of
the speci￿c tari⁄s ￿H
x and ￿F
x .
On the other hand, if the producer and supplier fail to reach an agreement in their stage-3
bargaining, they will be left with a payo⁄ equal to 0.40 The stage-3 Nash bargaining problem
39We abstract here from the possibility that ￿rms might engage in transfer-pricing-type behavior in order to avoid
trade taxes or collect trade subsidies. In our setting, this amounts to assuming that ￿rms do not have other (non-price)
means to transfer surplus between them in their bilateral bargain. If they did have such means, then the price they
negotiate would be determined completely by the sign of the trade taxes subject only to the ability of governments
to regulate such behavior. Even without such means, the ￿rms in our model do respond to government trade taxes
by negotiating di⁄erent prices, but at least when these ￿rms are taken to be engaged in arms-length transactions this
would not be interpreted as transfer pricing in the traditional sense.
40It would be straightforward to extend the analysis to include a secondary market that generates positive outside
options for both types of producers.
36between the home producer and foreign supplier can then be characterized as follows:
Max!H;!F !H!F
s:t: !H = y(x) ￿ (1 + tH
x )(1 + tF
x )!F:
The solution to this bargaining problem yields !H = 1
2y(x) and !F = 1
2
y(x)
(1+tH
x )(1+tF
x ), and an implied
foreign exporter price of ^ p￿
x =
1
2y(x)
(1+tH
x )x. The choice of x at stage 2 is then governed by
1
2
y0(^ x) = (1 + tH
x )(1 + tF
x ); (32)
and hence ^ x continues to be decreasing in the (ad valorem) tari⁄s tH
x and tF
x , despite the novel
channel through which the ad valorem tari⁄s a⁄ect the bargaining between home producer and
foreign supplier. With this, we can now write the stage-1 payo⁄s of the home and foreign ￿rm as
￿H =
1
2
y(^ x); and
￿F =
1
2
y(^ x)
(1 + tH
x )(1 + tF
x )
￿ ^ x:
We consider next the Nash tari⁄ choices. With tH
1 = tF
1 ￿ 0, home and foreign welfare are now
given by
WH = CS(1) + ￿H + tH
x ^ p￿
x^ x = CS(1) +
1
2
y(^ x) +
1
2
tH
x y(^ x)
(1 + tH
x )
;
WF = CS(1) + ￿F +
tF
x
1 + tF
x
^ p￿
x^ x = CS(1) +
1
2
y(^ x)
(1 + tH
x )
￿ ^ x:
It is direct to show that the ￿rst-order condition for tF
x implies y0(^ x) = 2(1 + tH
x ). Hence, to
check whether ^ tHN
x might achieve international e¢ ciency in light of ^ tFN
x , we may observe that, in
combination with ^ tFN
x , international e¢ ciency would require tH
x = ￿1
2. But di⁄erentiating WH
with respect to tH
x yields
@WH
@tH
x
=
1
2
y0(^ x)
(1 + 2tH
x )
(1 + tH
x )
@^ x
@tH
x
+
1
2
y(^ x)
(1 + tH
x )
2;
which is strictly positive when evaluated at the internationally e¢ cient level of tH
x = ￿1
2: by
implication, then, ^ tHN
x is higher than the internationally e¢ cient level.
Hence, while the mechanisms through which speci￿c and ad valorem tari⁄s on traded inputs
in￿ uence the international hold-up problem are distinct, the broad conclusions are the same. Com-
bining this with our earlier observation that the form of the ￿nal-good tari⁄ is immaterial, we may
conclude that the central ￿ndings of our Benchmark Model are robust to the form (ad valorem or
37speci￿c) that tari⁄s take, despite the di⁄erent mechanisms that operate in the two environments.41
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have initiated the study of trade agreements in the presence of o⁄shoring. Our
￿ndings indicate that the rise of o⁄shoring is likely to complicate the task of trade agreements for
two speci￿c reasons.
First, in the presence of o⁄shoring the mechanism by which countries can shift the costs of
intervention on to their trading partners is more complicated and extends to a wider set of policies
than is the case when o⁄shoring of customized inputs is not present. And second, the underlying
problem that a trade agreement must address in the presence of o⁄shoring varies with the political
preferences of member governments, a complication that does not arise in the absence of o⁄shoring.
As a consequence of the ￿rst complication, the increasing prevalence of o⁄shoring makes it
likely that e⁄ective trade agreements must extend their focus beyond the traditional market access
concerns of establishing and maintaining conditions of competition to cover as well the conditions
of bargaining: as we have observed, this suggests the need for negotiations that might potentially
cover a wide array of internal/domestic measures that have not typically been included in the
traditional focus of trade agreements. As a consequence of the second complication, the increasing
prevalence of o⁄shoring is likely to make it increasingly di¢ cult for governments to rely on simple
and general rules to help them solve their trade-related problems: this suggests that rules such
as reciprocity and non-discrimination, which have been pillars of the multilateral trading system
under the GATT/WTO, may become less e⁄ective as the prevalence of o⁄shoring rises.
Our paper raises many new questions, both theoretical and empirical. Are international prices
best thought of as determined through countless bilateral bargains between buyers and sellers, or
rather through anonymous market clearing mechanisms? To the extent that it is the former, Do the
trade policy stances of governments in practice have systematic impacts on bargaining outcomes
and, through this channel, on trade volumes? Which aspects of the evolving architecture of the
GATT/WTO might be best understood from the perspective of the theory we develop here as
responses to the rise of o⁄shoring in the world economy? And more generally, does the changing
nature of international trade indicate the need for fundamental changes in the nature of regional
and multilateral institutions that govern the world trading system? These and related questions
strike us as especially fertile areas for further research.
41It is interesting to observe that the novel channel through which ad valorem tari⁄s alter the bargaining outcome
between home producer and foreign supplier ￿namely, the slope of the bargaining frontier ￿also suggests that these
policy instruments may have a broader class of applicability with regard to their ability to mitigate international
hold-up problems than is the case for speci￿c tari⁄s. For example, if x were reinterpreted as the unveri￿able quality
of a ￿xed unit to be traded, so that tari⁄ policy could not then be conditioned on x, a speci￿c tari⁄ on trade in
x would lose its ability to a⁄ect the hold-up problem, but an ad valorem tari⁄ would continue to be useful in this
regard.
38Appendix A
A.1. Second-Order Conditions
In this Appendix we provide a discussion of the second-order conditions of the main tari⁄ setting games
developed in the main text.
Second-Best Policy Choices in the Benchmark Model
It is easily veri￿ed that the second order conditions associated with the ￿rst-order conditions in (7) are
satis￿ed. Simply note that evaluated at the equilibrium, we have
@2WW
@
￿
￿H
1
￿2 =
@D1
@pH
1
+ y00 (^ x)
￿
@^ x
@￿H
1
￿2
< 0
@2WW
@ (￿x)
2 = y00 (^ x)
￿
@^ x
@￿x
￿2
< 0
@2WW
@￿x@￿H
1
= y00 (^ x)
@^ x
@￿H
1
@^ x
@￿x
> 0
and thus
￿
@2WW=@
￿
￿H
1
￿2￿￿
@2WW=@ (￿x)
2
￿
￿
￿
@2WW=@￿x@￿H
1
￿2
=
￿
@D1=@pH
1
￿
y00 (^ x)(@^ x=@￿x)
2 > 0.
Nash Equilibrium Policy Choices in the Benchmark Model
We now consider the second-order conditions of the Nash equilibrium. Using equation (14), that is 1
2
￿
1 + ^ ￿
H
1
￿
y0 (^ x) =
1 + 1
2^ ￿
H
x + 1
2^ ￿
F
x , we can simplify the ￿rst-order conditions to obtain:
@WH
@￿H
1
= 0 = ￿H
1
@D1
@pH
1
￿
1
2
y (^ x) +
￿
y0 (^ x) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿F
x
￿ @^ x
@￿H
1
;
@WH
@￿H
x
= 0 =
1
2
^ x +
￿
y0 (^ x) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿F
x
￿ @^ x
@￿H
x
; and
@WF
@￿F
x
= 0 =
1
2
^ x + ￿F
x
@^ x
@￿F
x
.
Consider ￿rst the second-order condition for the choice of ￿F
x , i.e., @2WH=@
￿
￿F
x
￿2
< 0. Di⁄erentiating
the last expression above with respect to ￿F
x , we have
@2WF
@ (￿F
x )
2 =
3
2
@^ x
@￿F
x
+ ￿F
x
@2^ x
@ (￿F
x )
2: (A1)
But using the implicit function theorem on (14), we have
@^ x
@￿F
x
=
1
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y00 (^ x)
, (A2)
which implies
@2^ x
@ (￿F
x )
2 = ￿
1
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
(y00 (^ x))
2y000 (^ x)
@^ x
@￿F
x
. (A3)
39Using these expressions as well as ￿F
x = ￿1
2^ x=
￿
@^ x=@￿F
x
￿
, we can write (A1) as
@2WF
@ (￿F
x )
2 =
1
2
@^ x
@￿F
x
￿
3 +
^ xy000 (^ x)
y00 (^ x)
￿
,
which is negative only if 3+^ xy000 (^ x)=y00 (^ x) > 0. As an example, assume that y (x) = x￿=￿, with ￿ 2 (0;1). In
such case, we have y00 (x) = (￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿2 and y000 (x) = (￿ ￿ 2)(￿ ￿ 1)x￿￿3, and hence 3+ ^ xy000 (^ x)=y00 (^ x) =
1 + ￿, which is indeed positive.
The fact that in the Nash equilibrium we have ^ ￿
H
1 6= 0 implies that the second-order conditions for the
choice of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x are quite cumbersome to characterize, as they will now also involve properties of the
demand function. Throughout the paper, we simply assume that they are satis￿ed without providing the
exact conditions needed.
We next, however, develop a particular case of our model where the second order conditions are easy
to characterize and simple comparative statics can be obtained. In particular, we make the simplifying
assumption that demand for the ￿nal-good is perfectly elastic, which implies that ^ ￿
H
1 = 0. Under this
assumption note that it is su¢ cient to check that @2WH=@
￿
￿H
x
￿2
< 0, which requires that
@2WH
@ (￿H
x )
2 =
1
2
@^ x
@￿H
x
+ y00 (^ x)
￿
@^ x
@￿H
x
￿2
+ [y0 (^ x) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿F
x ]
@2^ x
@ (￿H
x )
2 < 0.
Imposing @WH=@￿H
x = 0 to eliminate ￿F
x and plugging equations (A2) and (A3) ￿which also apply for ￿H
x
￿ , we can simplify the above expression to:
@2WH
@ (￿H
x )
2 =
1
2
@^ x
@￿H
x
￿
3 +
^ xy000 (^ x)
y00 (^ x)
￿
< 0,
This again requires 3 + ^ xy000 (^ x)=y00 (^ x) > 0, which is the same condition as in the choice of ￿F
x .
A.2. Non-Negativity Constraints
In the extension of the model in section 5.1, we have ignored situations in which equilibrium trade policies
might violate the non-negativity constraints on the outside options and the surplus available to agents in
the negotiation. The purpose of this Appendix is to explore those situations and show how they do not
invalidate the main results of the paper. To save space, we focus on an analysis of the case with symmetric
Nash bargaining, and only brie￿ y comment on the model with generalized bargaining. With symmetric
bargaining power, the surplus over which the producer and the supplier bargain is given by
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
^ x, (A4)
where remember that the equilibrium ^ x satis￿es
1
2
(1 + ￿H
1 )y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
￿H
x +
1
2
￿F
x . (A5)
Our ￿rst result is that regardless of the equilibrium values of ￿H
1 , ￿H
x , and ￿F
x , the surplus in equation (A4)
will always be non-negative. To see this, note that using (A5) we can write
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (^ x) ￿ (1 + ￿H
1 )^ xy0 (^ x) = 2^ x + ^ x￿H
x + ^ x￿F
x ￿ ^ x￿H
x + ^ x￿F
x ,
40where we have used that the concavity of y (￿) implies y0 (^ x) ^ x < y (^ x). Hence, the non-negativity constraint
on the surplus can be ignored hereafter. Intuitively, no matter how distortionary trade taxes are, the level
of investment x will adjust to ensure a positive joint surplus of the relationship.
Matters are not as simple with regards to the outside option of each producer. In particular, we are now
careful to de￿ne this outside option as follows:
max
￿
1
2
￿(1 + ￿H
1 )y (x) ￿
1
2
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x;0
￿
.
It is straightforward to see that whenever ￿ ! 0, both producers will ￿nd it optimal to ignore the secondary
market and simply throw away the amount x of input produced. In such a case, both outside options are
zero and the (ex-post) payo⁄ to both the producer and the supplier is given by
￿F = ￿S =
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 )y (x) ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x
￿
; (A6)
which is the same expression as in the Benchmark model and as in the model in section 5.1 when ￿ = 1=2.
This implies that the analysis remains unchanged even when the non-negativity constraint is taken into
account.
Finally, consider the model in section 5.1 with general bargaining power ￿ for Home producers. In
such a case, it will also be true that for a low enough ￿, the outside option of either home producers
or foreign suppliers will be non-negative, in which case the secondary market will remain inactive. As a
result, generalized Nash bargaining in stage 3 will leave the ￿nal-good producer in H with a payo⁄ equal
to ￿
￿
1 + ￿H
1
￿
y (x) ￿ ￿
￿
￿H
x + ￿F
x
￿
x; with the supplier in F now receiving a stage-3 payo⁄ of (1 ￿ ￿)(1 +
￿H
1 )y (x) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿H
x + ￿F
x )x. These are the same expressions we obtained in section 5.1, and hence the
same results will apply.
A.3. Location of the Secondary Market
We consider here the possibility that the secondary market for the foreign supplier is located in the foreign
country. This implies that, in the event of disagreement with the ￿nal-good producer in H, the input supplier
in F sells the inputs locally in the foreign country rather than exporting to an alternative buyer in H. There
are a number of reasons to think that this possibility could be re￿ ected in a richer model (e.g., as a result
of search frictions associated with ￿nding international partners on short notice that can be avoided with
domestic matches), but rather than attempting to model these reasons explicitly we simply assume outright
that there exists a secondary market in the foreign country (only) where a match with a local producer results
in the production of an amount y(x) of the generic good, and we return to the assumption of symmetric
bargaining power.
The key di⁄erence relative to the Benchmark Model is in the outside options. The home producers
now obtain no income in the secondary market, while foreign producers now obtain 1
2￿(1 + ￿F
1 )y (x) in that
market, where ￿F
1 is a foreign trade tax on the ￿nal good. Arguing as before, it is easy to see that the
￿nal-good producer in H now has a stage-3 payo⁄ of
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 ) ￿
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y (x) ￿
1
2
(￿H
x + ￿F
x )x;
41with the supplier in F now receiving a stage-3 payo⁄ of
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 ) +
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y (x) ￿
1
2
(￿H
x + ￿F
x )x;
so that the stage-2 choice of ^ x is now de￿ned by
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 ) +
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y0 (^ x) = 1 +
1
2
(￿H
x + ￿F
x ); (A7)
and hence the stage-1 payo⁄s of the home and foreign ￿rm are given by
￿H =
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 ) ￿
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y (^ x) ￿
1
2
(￿H
x + ￿F
x )^ x; and
￿F =
1
2
￿
(1 + ￿H
1 ) +
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y (^ x) ￿
1
2
(￿H
x + ￿F
x )^ x ￿ ^ x:
Anticipating that F may now have reason to alter pF
1 with its choice of ￿F
1 (for reasons analogous to H￿ s
incentive to alter pH
1 with its choice of ￿H
1 ) and hence a⁄ect foreign consumer surplus CS(pF
1 ), and noting
that none (or to be precise, a measure 0) of good 1 is actually produced in F in equilibrium, home and
foreign welfare are then given by
WH = CS(pH
1 ) + ￿H + ￿H
1 [D1(pH
1 ) ￿ y (^ x)] + ￿H
x ^ x; and
WF = CS(pF
1 ) + ￿F + ￿F
1 D(pF
1 ) + ￿F
x ^ x:
The ￿rst-order conditions that de￿ne the Nash policies ^ ￿
HN
1 , ^ ￿
HN
x , ^ ￿
FN
1 and ^ ￿
FN
x can be manipulated
to yield
^ ￿
HN
1 =
1
2^ x[y0 (^ x) ￿
y(^ x)
^ x ]
￿@D1=@pH
1
;
^ ￿
HN
x = ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿H
1 ) ￿
1
2
￿(1 + ￿F
1 )
￿
y0 (^ x) ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
+ ^ ￿
FN
x ;
^ ￿
FN
1 =
1
4￿^ x[y0 (^ x) +
y(^ x)
^ x ]
￿@D1=@pF
1
; and
^ ￿
FN
x = ￿
1
2
^ x
@^ x=@￿F
x
:
Again, the expression for ^ ￿
HN
1 is negative, and is similar to the expression derived in the Benchmark
Model and contained in (10). The intuition is also analogous to that in the Benchmark Model: the home
government ￿nds it optimal to set a negative ^ ￿
HN
1 as a means of shifting surplus from foreign suppliers
to the home country. The dual role that ^ ￿
HN
x plays in alleviating the hold-up problem and at same time
transferring surplus implies again that its sign is in general ambiguous.
This extension of the model delivers more interesting implications for the Nash policies adopted by the
foreign government. First, as in the Benchmark model, the foreign government has an incentive to set a
positive export tax on the intermediate input (^ ￿
FN
x > 0), because the foreign input supplier can pass part of
this cost on to home producers by threatening not to deliver the intermediate input. The key for this is that
the outside option for the supplier is not reduced one to one with ￿F
x . In the present variant of the model,
this is not only due to less-than-full bargaining power for suppliers but also to the fact that the secondary
42market does not involve trade ￿ ows.
Second, and contrary to all of the models explored above, foreign taxes on the ￿nal good 1 can now
a⁄ect the distribution of surplus between home and foreign producers. As a result, the foreign government
now chooses to optimally balance the relative roles of ^ ￿
FN
x and ^ ￿
FN
1 in extracting surplus from home ￿rms
in the same way that the home government balances ^ ￿
HN
x and ^ ￿
HN
1 in extracting surplus from foreign ￿rms.
For the foreign government this implies the use of a foreign import tari⁄ or export subsidy (^ ￿
FN
1 > 0) on
the ￿nal good in order to raise pF
1 and thus improve the outside option (and bargaining position) of foreign
suppliers.
Although we have shown that the location of the secondary market has implications for the Nash equilib-
rium values of home and foreign trade policies, it is important again to emphasize the two general features of
our model that continue to hold in this extension as well. First, manipulating the above ￿rst-order conditions
and applying the implicit function theorem to (A7), we ￿nd
y0 (^ x) = 1 ￿
^ x
@^ x=@￿H
x
> 1;
which indicates that again, under Nash policy choices, the international hold-up problem persists and the
volume of international input trade is ine¢ ciently low as a consequence. Second, as we have indicated our
model predicts the equilibrium use of taxes in the ￿nal good market and these distortions arise as a result of
each country￿ s attempts to extract bargaining surplus from ￿rms abroad. Once again therefore, the purpose
of a trade agreement remains to help governments better solve these two problems.
Appendix B: A Competitive Benchmark
For comparison, we now develop the competitive analogue of our (political-economy augmented) model. We
suppose that foreign inputs are competitively supplied according to the supply curve
xF
S ￿ xF
S(pF
x );
In country H, the ￿nal good 1 is produced according to the concave production function y(x), and the
marginal cost of production of ￿nal good 1 is given by
mcH
1 =
pH
x
y0(x)
:
Competitive supply of ￿nal good 1 in country H is then determined according to pH
1 = mcH
1 or
pH
1 =
pH
x
y0(xH
D)
;
which implicitly de￿nes xH
D, the derived demand for the input x, as
xH
D = y0￿1 ￿
pH
x =pH
1
￿
￿ xH
D(pH
1 ;pH
x ):
The pricing relationships are (with p￿
x the international or world/untaxed price):
pH
1 = 1 + ￿H
1 ￿ pH
1 (￿H
1 ); pH
x = p￿
x + ￿H
x ￿ pH
x (￿H
x ;p￿
x); pF
x = p￿
x ￿ ￿F
x ￿ pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x):
43The market-clearing condition in the world (home and foreign) x market is then given by xH
D = xF
S, or
xH
D(pH
1 (￿H
1 );pH
x (￿H
x ;p￿
x)) = xF
S(pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x)); (B1)
which determines p￿
x(￿H
1 ;￿H
x ;￿F
x ). Market-clearing input trade volume may then be written as ^ x(pH
1 ;pH
x ) ￿
xH
D(pH
1 (￿H
1 );pH
x (￿H
x ;p￿
x(￿H
1 ;￿H
x ;￿F
x ))) or equivalently ^ x(pF
x ) ￿ xF
S(pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x(￿H
1 ;￿H
x ;￿F
x ))) . We also have
y(pH
1 ;pH
x ) ￿ y(^ x(pH
1 ;pH
x )). Notice that (B1) can be di⁄erentiated to yield
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
=
￿
@x
H
D(p
H
1 ;p
H
x )
@pH
x
@xH
D(pH
1 ;pH
x )
@pH
x ￿
@xF
S (pF
x )
@pF
x
< 0;
@p￿
x
@￿F
x
=
￿
@x
F
S (p
F
x )
@pF
x
@xH
D(pH
1 ;pH
x )
@pH
x ￿
@xF
S (pF
x )
@pF
x
> 0;
and so we have that
1 =
@p￿
x
@￿F
x
￿
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
: (B2)
The home welfare function may now be written as:
WH = CS(pH
1 ) + ￿H
Z p
H
1
0
y(p;pH
x )dp + (pH
1 ￿ 1)[DH
1 (pH
1 ) ￿ y(pH
1 ;pH
x )] + (pH
x ￿ p￿
x)^ x(pH
1 ;pH
x );
or
WH ￿ WH(pH
1 ;pH
x ;p￿
x):
Similarly, the foreign welfare function may now be written as:
WF = CS(1) + ￿F
Z p
F
x
0
xF
S(p)dp + (p￿
x ￿ pF
x )^ x(pF
x );
or
WF ￿ WF(pF
x ;p￿
x):
Using the fact that WF
p￿
x = ￿WH
p￿
x = ^ x, the e¢ ciency frontier is de￿ned by the three conditions:
WH
pH
x + [WH
pH
x + WF
pF
x ]
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
= 0;
￿WF
pF
x + [WF
pF
x + WH
pH
x ]
@p￿
x
@￿F
x
= 0; and
WH
pH
1 + [WH
pH
x + WF
pF
x ]
@p￿
x
@￿H
1
= 0:
Using (B2), it is easy to show that the ￿rst two ￿rst-order conditions are identical, and therefore determine
the sum of ￿H
x and ￿F
x that is consistent with international e¢ ciency.
To further interpret the conditions for e¢ ciency, we multiply the ￿rst e¢ ciency condition by ￿[
@p
￿
x=@￿
H
1
@p￿
x=@￿H
x ]
and add it to the third e¢ ciency condition, so that we may then restate the two conditions for international
e¢ ciency as
WH
pH
x + [WH
pH
x + WF
pF
x ]
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
= 0; and (B3)
WH
pH
1 ￿ WH
pH
x ￿
@p￿
x=@￿H
1
@p￿
x=@￿H
x
= 0:
44The interpretation of (B3) is as follows. Let us begin with the second e¢ ciency condition. On the left-
hand side is the impact on home welfare of (in￿nitessimal) changes in the mix of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x which hold
￿xed p￿
x ￿and hence, by (B1) and with ￿F
x and thus pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x) unchanged, hold ￿xed as well the level
of xH
D and therefore the equilibrium level of input trade volume ^ x. Notice, though, that foreign welfare
WF(pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x);p￿
x) is una⁄ected by such changes, because p￿
x is held ￿xed and ￿F
x is not changed and so,
as already mentioned, pF
x (￿F
x ;p￿
x) is held ￿xed as well. Hence, the second e¢ ciency condition in (B3) says
simply that, at internationally e¢ cient choices of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x , such changes can have no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on
home welfare either. The ￿rst e¢ ciency condition in (B3) then ensures that the sum of ￿H
x and ￿F
x achieves
the e¢ cient level of pF
x , and hence the e¢ cient level of input trade volume in light of the mix of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x
that the home country employs to deliver the chosen level of p￿
x and (with ￿F
x ￿xed) pF
x .
Next consider the Nash policies. The associated ￿rst-order conditions are
WH
pH
x + [WH
pH
x + WH
p￿
x]
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
= 0; (B4)
￿WF
pF
x + [WF
pF
x + WF
p￿
x]
@p￿
x
@￿F
x
= 0; and
WH
pH
1 + [WH
pH
x + WH
p￿
x]
@p￿
x
@￿H
1
= 0:
Using (B2) and WF
p￿
x = ￿WH
p￿
x, the ￿rst two Nash ￿rst-order conditions can be added together to yield:
WH
pH
x + [WH
pH
x + WF
pF
x ]
@p￿
x
@￿H
x
+ WF
p￿
x = 0: (B5)
Comparing (B5) to the ￿rst e¢ ciency condition in (B3), the di⁄erence is the additional term WF
p￿
x > 0 on
the left-hand side of (B5), which implies that the sum ￿H
x + ￿F
x is ine¢ ciently high (the ￿rst-order condition
for e¢ ciency is negative at the Nash taxes), and therefore that the Nash level of input trade volume is
ine¢ ciently low in light of the mix of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x that the home country employs in the Nash equilibrium to
deliver the chosen level of p￿
x and (with ￿F
x ￿xed) pF
x .
Next we multiply the initial ￿rst-order condition in (B4) by ￿[
@p
￿
x=@￿
H
1
@p￿
x=@￿H
x ] and add it to the last ￿rst-order
condition to get
WH
pH
1 ￿ WH
pH
x ￿
@p￿
x=@￿H
1
@p￿
x=@￿H
x
= 0: (B6)
Comparing (B6) to the second e¢ ciency condition in (B3), we may conclude that the mix of ￿H
1 and ￿H
x
that the home country employs in the Nash equilibrium to deliver its chosen level of p￿
x and hence pF
x ￿
and therefore by (B1), xH
D and hence ^ x ￿is internationally e¢ cient (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001, for an
analogous observation).
Therefore, we may conclude that the single ine¢ ciency in the Nash equilibrium in our competitive bench-
mark model is that the sum ￿H
x + ￿F
x is ine¢ ciently high, and hence that there is too little equilibrium input
trade volume/input ￿market access￿ : in the competitive benchmark model, the task of a trade agreement
is thus to expand and secure market access to internationally e¢ cient levels (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2001,
2002, for an interpretation of analogous ￿ndings from a market access perspective).
Next consider the political optimum conditions. Speci￿cally, consider the hypothetical situation that
governments are not motivated by the impact of their tari⁄choices on p￿
x, in the speci￿c sense that WH
p￿
x
@p
￿
x
@￿H
1
=
WH
p￿
x
@p
￿
x
@￿H
x ￿ 0 and similarly for WF. We then identify the tari⁄s that would be chosen unilaterally (i.e., non-
45cooperatively) by governments with these hypothetical preferences and ask whether these tari⁄s are e¢ cient
with respect to the actual government preferences. This is Bagwell and Staiger￿ s (1999) original de￿nition,
and it is direct to show using (B4) that in our competitive benchmark model the following conditions de￿ne
the political optimum:
WH
pH
x = 0; WF
pF
x = 0; and WH
pH
1 = 0: (B7)
Clearly, as an examination of (B3) indicates, the political optimum de￿ned in (B7) is e¢ cient in this setting,
whether or not governments are motivated by political economy concerns, so we now have shown that the
standard terms-of-trade theory applies in a competitive-supplier version of our set-up.
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